Appendix G – Emergency Response Plan V4

MEADOWBANK GOLD PROJECT

Emergency Response Plan

Prepared by:
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited – Meadowbank Division

Version 4
July 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is activated when a operations-related emergency, accident or malfunction occurs, or if such an incident is foreseeable. The ERP outlines potential emergency scenarios, initial actions for emergencies and the internal and external resources available including personnel, emergency response equipment and communication systems.

The ERP will be reviewed and updated at least annually.

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

This Plan will be immediately implemented**.**

DISTRIBUTION LIST

AEM – General Mine Manager / Designate

AEM – General Superintendent Operations

AEM – General Superintendent Maintenance

AEM - General Superintendent General Services

AEM – Health and Safety Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Human Resources Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Engineering Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Geology Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Environment Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Mill Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Site Services Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Mine Superintendent / Designate

AEM – Maintenance Superintendent / designate

AEM – Emergency Response Counselors

AEM – OHSC Co-chairs

AEM - Security

DOCUMENT CONTROL

Version	Date (YMD)	Section	Page	Revision
1	08/10/31	Appendix A		Revision to include East Dike design modifications
2	09/11/16	All Sections		Confirmation of specific details and procedures Account for as-built designs and emergency preparedness for dike failure scenarios
3	12/01/31	All Sections		Review of all the documents
4	12/07/27	All Sections		Review of all documents

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SECTION 1 • INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

The purpose of this Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is to provide a consolidated source of information for employees, contractors, and site visitors to respond quickly and efficiently to any foreseeable emergency that would likely occur at the Meadowbank project site. This ERP forms a component of the Environmental Management System (EMS) for the Project. As such, it is a working document that will be reviewed and updated on a regular basis as mine development, construction and operations proceed.

This ERP addresses gold mining, processing, transportation and related activities at the Meadowbank site as well as possible emergency scenarios that may occur off-site along the All Weather Private Access Road or at the Baker Lake Marshalling Facility. Guiding the development of this document has been the principle that an effective ERP must provide:

- A clear chain of command for safety and health activities;
- Well-defined corporate expectations regarding safety and health;
- Comprehensive hazard prevention and control methods; and
- Record-keeping requirements to track program progress.

AEM will ensure that all employees, contractors and site visitors fully understand and comply with all legislated safety standards, and the policies and procedures outlined in the ERP.

This ERP will be reviewed annually, or more frequently as required, to ensure compliance with applicable legislation, to evaluate its effectiveness and to continually improve the procedures. All employees, contractors and site visitors are encouraged to offer suggestions for ways to eliminate potential hazards and improve work procedures.

1.2 AEM'S POLICY STATEMENT

AEM is committed to protecting the health and safety of all its workers and the environment, and to adhering to all legislated safety standards. The necessary resources will be available to respond quickly and efficiently to all emergencies to prevent injury to, or degradation of, the health of individuals or the environment. In implementing this emergency response policy, AEM will set preparedness targets and report its progress on a regular basis.

To this end:

All relevant safety and emergency response laws and regulations will be incorporated into the ERP as minimum standards.

Senior management is responsible for making funds and other resources available, including hiring and training qualified personnel, to ensure the successful implementation of the ERP in the event of an emergency.

All supervisors are responsible for ensuring that their employees are aware of, and trained in, the proper emergency response procedures and that procedures and contact information are posted in all work areas. Supervisors are also responsible for ensuring that all employees follow safe work methods and all related regulations to prevent emergencies from occurring, and that they are provided with the proper tools to do so, including Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

An emergency response team and coordination centre is establishes at the Meadowbank site.

The ERP will be tested on a periodic basis to ensure its effectiveness.

1.3 POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CONTRACTORS AND VISITORS

Every person working at or visiting the Meadowbank site receives an orientation upon arrival and as such is apprised of, and required to follow the ERP policies and procedures set forth in this manual. For a list of responsibilities, see Section 2.

Major contractors, such as those for mining and hauling, are required to have their own HS services. This is verified by AEM management prior to engagement of the contractor.

1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

AEM is committed to achieving a high standard of environmental care in conducting its mineral exploration activities. AEM's Environmental Policy includes:

- Compliance with all applicable legislation including laws, regulations, and standards. Where laws do not exist, appropriate standards will be applied to minimize environmental impacts resulting from exploration activities.
- Open communication with government, the community, and employees on environmental issues.
- Development and adherence to management systems that adequately identify, monitor, and control environmental risks associated with AEM's exploration activities.
- Assurance that the employees are aware of their responsibilities and comply with AEM's Environmental Policy and field guide.

It is the policy of AEM to protect the environment, public health and safety, and natural resources by conducting operations in an environmentally sound manner while pursuing continuous improvement of our environmental performance.

SECTION 2 • ORGANIZATIONAL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This section details the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in emergency response planning and implementation at the Meadowbank mine site.

2.1 GENERAL MANAGER

The General Manager is responsible for implementing and maintaining the ERP. In addition, the General Manager's responsibilities are to:

- Act as a spokesperson on behalf of AEM with the public, media, and government agencies, as required;
- Prepare and submit any formal reports (within the required time frame) to regulators and AEM management detailing the occurrence of an emergency; this includes submitting an incident reporting form;
- Ensure that the Health & Safety and Environment Superintendents have the means (financial and otherwise) to ensure that all required resources are made available, or provided from off-site if required;
- Work with the H&S, Human Resources and Environment Superintendent to evaluate what training is required by all staff, ensure that all staff are given appropriate training, and ensure that all staff are retrained as needed;
- Ensure that the Human Resources Superintendent has the means (financial and otherwise) to ensure that all employees' training requirements are current;
- Ensure that inspections of emergency response training practices and emergency response equipment are carried out;
- Ensure that emergency response exercises are conducted annually,
- Ensure that the results of the regular inspections are used to improve emergency response practices, and improve relevant plans accordingly;
- Complete an annual detailed review of the ERP with the management team and the Join Health and Safety Committee with particular emphasis on the objectives and methods of the plan, and the job descriptions of all positions named within;
- Ensure that updates to new emergency communications information (new phone numbers, changes in reporting structure, etc.) are distributed as soon as the new information becomes available;
- Keep a formal record of distribution and amendments to the ERP; and

2.2 EMERGENCY CONTROL TEAM – *ON SITE MANAGEMENT TEAM*

No single department can handle an emergency situation alone. Everyone must work together to manage the emergency and coordinate the effective use of all available resources.

Therefore at the time of any emergency, all the management team and/or their designate must report to the 3rd floor Emergency Response Control room #1 or to the Emergency Response Control Room #2, at the Training room.

The Emergency Control Team structure lends support, fosters efficiency and provides additional knowledge during an emergency response situation.

The Official In-Charge, (General Mine Manager or Designate) maintains the overall coordination and direction of the Emergency and ensures the continued safety of all employees and the public.

However, the Superintendent or designate of the Area affected by the emergency, will assist with the development of the overall emergency response plan.

The remainder of the Emergency Control Team will be given specific tasks to perform that will assist with the management and coordination of the emergency response plan.

Roles & Responsibilities of the Emergency Control Group

2.2.1 Official In-Charge

The Official In-Charge (General Manager or designate) will take charge for overseeing and approving the overall emergency strategy.

Immediate duties of the Official In-Charge include:

- Consult with the Incident Commander the status of emergency.
- Appoint an Emergency Log Recorder to maintain a written record of the time and events, including all discussions, instructions and decisions made by the Emergency Control Team;
- Appoint a Muster Station Coordinator, who will ensure that proper head counts are conducted at three (3) designated Muster Stations.
- Issues specific tasks to the members of the Management as they arrive at the Control Room, as per this guideline;
- Brief the Emergency Control Team;
- Ensure that the safety of personnel is maintained, throughout the operation.
- Ensure procedures are in place for prompt dispatch of requested personnel, materials and equipment to the emergency area.

- Arrange for all reports to be presented at specific intervals to the Emergency Control Team

- Finalize the recommendations of the Incident Commander for rescue and recovery operations.

- The Official In-Charge is the only person authorized to release information to Government Agencies, Corporate Office or the Local Communities. He may delegate this activity to other members of the Emergency Control Team.

    - Verify all information you release;
    - Keep a record of all inquiries (media and non-media);
    - Do not speculate on causes;
    - Do not speculate on resumption of normal operations or when the problem will be solved;
    - Advise that further updates will be forth coming.

- Notify the corporate management, if the following appear probable:
    - fatalities;
    - injuries that could probably become items of local, regional or national media interest;
    - there is a public health or environmental risk;
    - an incident involving chemicals where there is a large volume or the potential for over reaction (e.g., cyanide);
    - a spill of effluent or contaminated water or chemical substance to an area that lies outside the area of drainage control of the mine site (i.e., an external spill);
    - mine operations may be stopped for more than two (2) days;
    - Government authorities will become involved.

- Ensure all response teams, regulatory agencies and any other agency on emergency alert notice are advised when the emergency has ended.

- Ensure all documentation (i.e., notes, log sheets, written instructions, etc.) is gathered for the creation of the final report.

- Participate in debriefing.

2.2.2 **General Superintendents:**

- General Services, Operations and Maintenance will report to the Emergency Control Room and support the General manager/Designate in whatever capacity required.

- They will also ensure that the Superintendent/Designate in each of their respective Department's is aware of the emergency.

- They will assist with the investigation and write up of the final report

2.2.3 **Incident Commander**: – **Usually a Trained Staff Member (ERT Coordinators or Supt. / GF.)**

The responsibilities of the Incident Commander include;

- Ensure Security has been notified of emergency;
- Ensure the evacuation procedures have been activated, if required;
- Ensure that there are sufficient ERT members available to respond to the emergency;
- Ensure that the ERT has back-up support, a standby Team;
- Ensure that ERT Team has refreshments and nourishment (if the emergency requires several hours to resolve);
- Assess the size and severity of the emergency and the likely consequences. Establish response priorities;
- Maintain communication with the ERT Captain.
- Advise the Official In-Charge of the ERT Team's activities, regarding the rescue and recovery operations.
- Appoint sufficient personnel, equipment and outside services are available. Utilize the members of the Emergency Control Team to organize these resources.
- Advise Official In-Charge when the emergency situation is under control and give the "All Clear".
- Participate in emergency investigation.
- Coordinate an orderly return to normal operating conditions.
- Arrange for a debriefing session, and utilize the services of all involved in resolving the emergency.
- Assist to write the final report.

2.2.4 **Emergency Log Recorder / Muster Station Coordinator: - "***keep a systematic record of the emergency events" and get an accurate "Head Count during Emergencies***"**

- These persons can be the Geology/ Engineering Supt/Designate/ General Supt.(whoever is available to perform these duties)

- The log is intended to be a systematic record of the events from the start of the emergency through all phases to termination, and will be used in the preparation of the final report. It is important that the log be legible and that all information is recorded.

Emergency Log Recorder: **"***Keep a systematic record of the emergency events, phone calls and directives,."*

- Date and time the incident was reported, who reported the event;
- Record all subsequent developments as they occur;
- Record all phone calls all discussions and decisions made;
- Record any other information that needs to be captured for the final report;
- Keep all the sheets of paper used to record information numbered, for the final report;
- All the pages will be initialed by the recorder and official in-charge;
- The official document will stay with the Health & Safety Department upon completion of the emergency.

Muster Station Coordinator: *" Provide a Head Count during Emergencies".*

- As soon as Management begins to assemble in the Emergency Control Room , the Person In Charge (the manager/designate) needs to assign a member of the Management Team to be responsible for ensuring that the Muster Stations are contacted.

- The Muster Station Coordinator is required to contact the three Muster Stations by telephone, to ensure that there is a Supervisor is in charge of that specific muster station and give him/her 20 minutes to achieve the head count.

- The Muster Station Coordinator will need to record the time the muster station was called, who is in-charge of the muster station, and any other instructions that have been given.

- The Muster Station Coordinator needs to open the Flo on his/her laptop in order to cross reference the names, once they receive the lists from the Muster Stations.(additional persons may need to be assigned to assist with the cross reference, in order to complete the head count in a timely manner).

2.2.5 Emergency Response Team (ERT Team) Duties:

- The ERT Team Members must report to the Fire Hall, when paged for a “code One” emergency;
- ERT Team Members will be given instructions on the emergency by the Incident Commander;
- ERT Team Members will follow instructions from the Incident Commander and will not put the Team at risk;
- The ERT Team Captain will maintain radio contact with the Incident Commander throughout the emergency:

2.2.6 Mine Superintendent/Designate Duties;

- Ensure that all employees working, are accounted for;
- Ensure that the ERT Members of his crew have responded to the “code One” emergency;
- If the “Emergency” is in the Pit, them assist the Official-in-Charge with the action plan to deal with the emergency:
- Assist as required by supplying equipment and/or manpower;
- Assist with restoring of the Operations back to normal operating standards:

2.2.7 Mill Superintendent/Designate Duties;

- Ensure all employees working, at this time, are accounted for;
- Ensure that the ERT Members on his crew, have responded to the “ Code One” emergency;
- If the “ Emergency” is in the Mill facilities, assist the Official-in-Charge with the action plan to deal with the emergency:
- Assist as required by supplying equipment and/or manpower;
- Assist with restoring of the Operations back to normal operating standards:

2.2.8 Environmental Superintendent/Designate Duties:

- The following are the responsibilities of the Environmental Superintendent/Designate;
- Provide technical advice on probable environmental effects resulting from a spill and how to minimize them;
- Provide advice to the Official-in-Charge for appropriate spill response procedures;
- Ensure that Environmental Staff are available to direct the spill response action plan;
- Assist with restoring of the Operations back to normal operating standards:

2.2.9 Health and Safety Superintendent/Designate Duties:

The Health and Safety Superintendent/Designate will be responsible for:

- Ensure that an Incident Commander is in place to oversee the ERT Teams;
- Ensure that all Management respond to the emergency and meet in the emergency control room;
- He will oversee all activities that require Security or Nursing. He will arrange for Medevac transport, if required;
- Will assist with getting a “head count” for the Official in-charge;
- Assist with obtaining outside help if required:

2.2.10 Site Services Superintendent/Designate Duties:

The following are the responsibilities of the Site Services Superintendent/Designate;

- Ensure that all his employees are accounted for
- Ensure that all ERT Member on his Crew, respond to the “ code One” emergency;
- If the “ Emergency” is involves the Site facilities, assist the Official-in-Charge with the action plan to deal with the emergency:
- Assist as required by supplying equipment and/or manpower;
- Assist with restoring of the Operations back to normal operating standards:

2.2.11 Maintenance Superintendent/Designate:

The following are the responsibilities of the Maintenance Superintendent/Designate:

- Ensure that all of his employees are accounted for;
- Ensure that all ERT Members of his crew respond to the “Code One” emergency;
- If the “Emergency” is in the Maintenance Shops, then assist the Official-in-Charge with the action plan to deal with the emergency;
- Assist as required by supplying equipment and/or manpower;
- Assist with restoring of the Operations back to normal operating standards:

2.2.12 Human Resources Superintendent/Designate Duties:

The following are the responsibilities of the Human Resources (HR) Superintendent/Designate;

- Ensure that all HR employees are accounted for;
- Provide assistance to the Official-in-Charge if there are employees issues, such as injuries, transportation requirements, etc.:

2.2.13 Health Care Professional (Nurse/Medic):

The on-site health professionals are responsible for the following:

- Providing on-site first aid and other medical support;
- Establish a triage location if there are multiple casualties;
- Arrange for medevac transportation, if required;
- Ensuring that the first aid room is maintained at all times, by using First Responders as support:

2.2.14 Security Department:

The on-Site Security Supervisor is responsible for the following:

- Ensuring that the Security officer has activated the appropriate level of emergency notification;
- Ensure that access points to the emergency are properly guarded.

- Notify the Baker Lake Gatehouse if the emergency involves the Alll weather private Road (AWPR).

- Assist with other duties as requested by the Emergency Control Group.

2.2. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMITTEE:

The Occupational Health and Safety Committee is responsible for:

- Review the emergency response plan on an annual basis.

- Assist with any investigation resulting from the emergency.

2.3 ALL EMPLOYEES:

All employees are responsible for:

- Reporting to the nearest Muster Station when an fire alarm is sounded;;
- Employees reporting to the Muster Station need to assemble at the placard that has their department name.
- Employee's must be quiet and await the "head count**".**

- Reporting any emergency by either using the radio on the dedicated emergency channel (#1) or using the telephone to call 6911, to describe the type, the location, and nature the emergency, including possible injuries, trapped personnel, and the presence of any chemical or explosive hazards.

2.4 SUPERVISOR:

The Supervisor is responsible for:

- Ensuring the " Code One" call in, is accurate and that all the pertinent information is available for the official-in-Charge. (providing details regarding the type, the location, and the nature of the emergency, including possible hazardous materials involved and health and safety concerns);

- Ensure all workers on his shift are accounted for:

2.5 OTHER PERSONNEL:

Depending on the nature of the emergency (medical, electrical, mechanical, fire, etc.) other site personnel, including the Site Electrician, Site Mechanic, and others, may be called upon to play key roles.

2.6 EMERGENCY RESPONSE CONTACT INFORMATION – INTERNAL & EXTERNAL

AEM internal emergency response personnel, their duties, and phone numbers has been compiled in Table 2.1, Important external contacts such as regulatory agencies, health organizations and transportation companies providing evacuation support are listed in Table 2.2.

Table 2.1: Internal Emergency Response Contact Information Chart

Position	Name/Location	24-Hour Contact #
General Manager	Dominique Girard	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6901 cell: 819-277-4080
Ast. General Manager	Jean Beliveau	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6901 Cell: 416-315-6745
Meadowbank Security	Denis Roy/Charles Blouin	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6847
Emergency Response Team	Emergency response personnel available on site to assist with spill and emergency response activities	Code One activated by Site Security
Incident Commander	Philippe Beaudoin	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6809 Radio Channel # 2
	Andre Rouleau	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext.6809 Radio channel # 2
Health and Safety Superintendent	Normand Ladouceur	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6720 cell: 819-860-6258
Health and safety Superintendent Assistant	Len Kutchaw (temp)	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6720 cell: 819-856-9051
Health Professionals / Medical Clinic	Medical Clinic 1	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6734
	Medical Clinic 2	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext. 6751
Human Resource Superintendent	Not filled	Ph: ext 6723 cell:
HR Ast. Supt.	Krystel Mayrand	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext 6723 Cell: 819-856-9556
Environment Superintendent	Kevin Buck	Ph: 867-793-4610 ext 6838 Cell: 819 856-1956

Table 2.2: External Emergency Phone Numbers

Organization / Authority	Telephone Number	Fax Number
NT-NU 24-HOUR SPILL REPORT LINE	867.920.8130	867.873.6924
Nunavut Water Board	867.360.6338	867.360.6369
Environment Canada, Environmental Protection Branch	867.669.4700	867.873.8185
Environment Canada: 24-hour emergency pager monitored by Emergency and Enforcement	867.920.5131	
Manager Pollution Control & Air Quality Environmental Protection, Government of Nunavut	867.975.7748	867.975.5981
General Inquiry Department of Environment, Government of Nunavut	867.975.7700	
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) – Water Resources Manager, Nunavut Regional Office	867.975.4550	867.975.4585
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) – Manager, Land Administration, Nunavut Regional Office	867.975.4280	867.975.4286
Kivalliq Inuit Association – Reporting Line	867.645.2810 or 867.645.2800	
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) – Nunavut Regional Office	867.979.8000	867.979.8039
Workers Safety and Compensation Commission Mine Inspector: Martin Van Rooy	800.661.0792 867.979.8527	
Keewatin Health Services – Baker Lake	867.793.2816 867.793.2813	
Keewatin Air Ambulance (Medevac) 24h/7 – Rankin Inlet dispatch	867.645.4455	
Baffin Regional Hospital (Iqaluit)	867.979.7300	
Baker Lake RCMP	867.793.0123	
Baker Lake RCMP – emergency number	867.793.1111	
Cambridge Bay RCMP	867.983.2111	
Baker Lake Hamlet Office	867.793.2874	
Baker Lake Fire Emergency	867.793.2900	
Baker Lake Fire Marshall's Office	867.873.7944	
Baker Lake Radio Station	867.793.2962	
Baker Lake Airport	867.793.2564	
Department of Environment Health	867.983.7328	
Poison Control Centre	867.920.4111	
Search and rescue – Artic Armed Forces Rescue Coordination Centre Trenton	800.267.7270 613.965.3870	
NAVCAN (Flight Information Center North Bay)	866.541.4109	
CANUTEC (Spill Support Information)	613.996.6666	
Charter Aircraft (for Evacuation)		
Keewatin Air Ambulance (Medevac)	867.645.4455	

24h/7 – Rankin Inlet dispatch		
Calm Air	204.677.0513 204.677.0519	
Nolinor	450.476.0018 888.505.7025	
First Air	867.669.6694 867.444.2002	
Helicopter Transport Services	613.839.5868	
Nunavut Emergency Management – Rankin Inlet	1-867-645-6803	
Nunavut Emergency Management – Iqaluit	1-800-693-1666 1-867-979-6262	

2.7 EMERGENCY COORDINATION CENTRE

Emergency operations will be directed out of the Emergency Control Centre (ECC). The ECC is located in the 3rd Floor of the Service Building Conference Room, or in the Training room on the main floor, from where the following will take place:

- Key decisions will be made and operations will be managed;
- Technical information to direct emergency activities will be provided;
- A communications centre will be established for emergency operations and to communicate with other organizations;
- Resource procurement will be provided and resource use will be directed;
- Any damage will be assessed and long-range objectives and plans will be developed; and
- Information on the emergency will be stored and disseminated to all necessary internal and external parties.

The following information is available at the centre:

- Shutdown procedures for operations;
- Locations of hazardous material storage areas;
- Locations of emergency and safety equipment;
- Locations of first aid stations and muster areas;
- Maps of communities and environmental maps;
- Information on location of other communications equipment, including portable sets;
- Information on emergency power;

- Contacts for other utilities;
- Operating manuals;
- Materials Safety Data Sheets (MSDS);
- List of personnel with alternate skills for use in emergencies;
- Type and location of alarm systems;
- Accident report forms;
- Accident status board and log book;
- Notification lists, staff lists, contact lists, with regular and emergency telephone/pages numbers, etc.

The ICC will be located at a safe and secure place near the site of the emergency. All responses and mitigation efforts developed at the ECC will be implemented through the ICC.

In the event of an emergency, security personnel may be required to establish and maintain a security perimeter to prevent or minimize injury to personnel, to preserve evidence for investigation, or to prevent unauthorized access to the scene.

2.8 TRAINING

The HR Superintendent is responsible for documenting, tracking, and updating all training activities. Record of training requirements and training attendance will be kept, tracked and updated for all employees by the HR Superintendent to ensure that retraining occurs as required.

For mine operations, AEM will ensure a sufficient number of trained ERT team members are on site at all times. All members of the ERT will be trained and familiar with emergency and spill response procedures. Emergency training will be conducted annually to ensure that a sufficient number of team members are available and that their training is up-to-date. The following will be included in the training:

- A review of the SCP and responsibilities of the team members;
- The nature, status, and location of fuel and chemical storage facilities;
- The location of on-site and off-site spill response equipment, and how to use it;
- Emergency contact lists;
- Desktop exercises of “worst case” scenarios; and
- The likely causes and possible effects of spills.

SECTION 3 • EMERGENCY RESPONSE EQUIPMENT

The Emergency Measures Counsellor will ensure that site drawings and equipment lists are posted conspicuously in key locations throughout the site so that important information is always readily available. This will include the following:

- Location and isolation points of energy sources;
- Location of emergency equipment (e.g., fire water pumps, fire extinguishers, monitors, self-contained breathing apparatus);
- Emergency procedures outlines, such as specialist firefighting, chemical neutralization;
- Location of equipment for combating pollution (e.g., booms, skimmers, pumps, absorbents, dispersants);
- Availability of internal and external emergency medical support (e.g., hospitals, clinics, ambulances, medical supplies, personnel with medical or first aid training);
- Location of toxicity testing facilities (e.g., gas and water);
- Location of wind direction / speed indicators;
- Directions on how to contact the local or regional weather forecasting service;
- Location of personal protective equipment and directions on its proper use; and
- Location of first aid stations and muster areas.

The Incident Commander, EMC, and Health and Safety Superintendent will know where, throughout the project site, all of this information is posted and where emergency equipment is stored. These individuals will also be trained in the proper use of emergency equipment.

External emergency response equipment includes the mobile emergency response equipment described in the SCP.

SECTION 4 • COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

The primary basis for communication will be the phone system; back-up communication will be available via satellite phone. For on-site communication, hand-held radios will be mandatory for all employees working or travelling in remote areas from the main camp. Cell phones can be used as an additional means of communication. Back-up power sources and replacement batteries for communications equipment will be available to provide continuous, uninterrupted operation either at fixed facilities or at emergency sites.

Key site personnel will be accessible at all times by either portable radios, radios in vehicles, or office radios. The Health Care Professional will carry a hand-held radio and will be available at all times. Security personnel will monitor the emergency channel twenty-four hours per day. Senior management personnel will rotate as “On-Call Managers” for after-hour emergencies. An accommodations list that highlights key personnel will be posted and updated as required.

Lists of employees trained in first aid, mine rescue, and Emergency Response will also be posted. Employees and contractors who will be on site for extended periods will be trained initially and then retrained annually. This training will include the locations and use of emergency equipment, terminology used, and who needs to be contacted immediately in the event of an emergency.

SECTION 5 • EMERGENCY MEASURES

In the event of an emergency, the employee will have to follow our emergency procedure:

- Emergency is initiated - by calling **6911** on desk type phones, or calling on Two-way radio on **Channel 1 – Code 1 – Code 1 – Code 1.**
- All communication stops except for those involved with the Emergency – I.e.: First Aid Room attendants, Medics, ERT as required.
- All work stops in First Aid Room / Clinic – and in affected area – depending on seriousness of Emergency – the whole site.
- First Aid Room Attendant / Medic will answer the phone and/or radio.

  Note: if the First Aid Room Attendant / Medic do not answer, then Security Guard will answer and/or a Supervisor on radio will answer so that Emergency Response can be initiated.
- **Responder –** will ask where the medic is required?
- **Caller –** will give a brief description of the Emergency – name, location and what is wrong and/or required.
- **Responder –** will confirm location and details of incident and activate the **ERT** team. Security will be notified by responder and a page will be sent out to all **ERT** team members on site. (All **ERT** team members on site now carry pagers).
- The person at the casualty(s) will administer First Aid if trained to do so.
- Incident Commander Center will be immobilized as to ensure that communications, transportation, and effective deployment of **ERT** resources are conducted. It is mandatory that the Official In-Charge be notified immediately.
    - Transportation will be arranged to meet at the **ERT** hall by the two large doors for medical gear and **ERT** team members.

The **ERT** team (minimum of 6 team members) will assemble as quickly as possible. (Expectation – when the page goes off – all **ERT** team members will make their way expediently to the **ERT** hall.

GENERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FLOWCHART



FIRE

The Camp Complex and Process Plant is equipped with a fire detection and audible fire warning system. All site operating personnel receive basic training in the use of fire extinguishers. This training is tracked by the HR Superintendent.

For any situation involving fires, the first action will be to extinguish the fire if it is safe to do so and then report the incident. If the person cannot safely put out the fire, it must be reported as quickly as possible. In the event of a fire alarm, all employees not directly involved with fighting the fire will report to the designated muster location (section 5.2). Employees will remain in this area until assigned other duties by the ERT or until given clearance that the emergency is over.

In the event that a fire causes damage to mining equipment, site buildings, or chemical containers, particulates and/or gases could be released into the air, and hazardous materials and/or other chemicals (e.g., fuels, oils, battery acid, lime, etc.) could be spilled. In the short-term, this could result in air quality degradation, and potentially affect the local vegetation in the case of a spill or burn scar. Should such scenarios occur, the following actions will be taken, as required and WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO:

- Air quality monitoring for airborne emissions;
- Collection and incineration of all putrescibles (food items);
- Removal of debris and contaminated soil for disposal on-site or off-site at a licensed disposal facility;

Further details on the cleanup of chemical spills are provided in the Spill Contingency Plan.

The incident commander will;

- Locate the source of fire.
- Dispatch the evacuation at the safest muster point.
- Assign a captain and his team.
- Ensure the security of all the ERT's members or any other service persons (medics, security guard, electricians, etc…).
- If the intervention of the mine inspector is necessary for a special investigation, he will ask to the security department to ensure the integrity of the scene.
- Call the end of the emergency measures and invites everyone evacuated to reintegrates their original locations.

General Manager or designate can decide to use any available machinery to separate all or part of a building to protect people or minimize losses.

Incident Reports are to be filed detailing the causes of the fires and responses undertaken. This information will be used by the EMC in subsequent fire prevention activities

5.1 MUSTER POINT

In the event that an evacuation is necessary, it is important that all affected personnel leave the emergency area and congregate at a pre-determined area or *Muster point* so that a head count can be taken to determine if there are any missing persons. Employees must remain at the muster point until the supervisor of the emergency area gives permission to return to work.

Upon hearing a fire alarm, smoke alarm, or evacuation alarm you shall ….

- ***Do Not Panic*** – Always ensure that you are prepared for the weather conditions – Dress appropriately – (Winter clothing during winter months).
- ***DO NOT*** delay and ***DO NOT*** stay and finish work before taking the proper steps to evacuate.
- Always **close** windows/doors as you leave your office etc.
- ***Always*** head to the ***closest*** **EXIT** door and follow **EXIT** signs to the closest outside door.
- Once outside head to the ***closest*** **"*Muster Station*".**
- Once in **"*Muster Station*"** – Stay put until relieved or instructed otherwise by your Supervisor.
- Your Supervisor and/or Senior Management person in your dept. will ***conduct a tally*** **(head count)** of everyone in his/her department. Ensure that you get your name on the **tally form**.
- Note: on nightshift, the highest level of Management may be a front line Supervisor.
- ***DO NOT*** **enter** a building when the alarm is sounding. Head straight to a "**Muster Station**".
- ***Never*** go through a building to get to a "**Muster Station**". Once you are outside, the first door you open should be the one to the "**Muster Station**".
- ***Never*** disregard an evacuation alarm. We understand that the system goes off without incident on occasion, but to disregard an ***alarm is to endanger your life and the lives of others.***
- ***Stay in*** "**Muster Station**" until you are instructed to "**Stand Down**" by the Incident Commander.
- ***Do Not*** leave "**Muster Station**" to go outside for a smoke. It is important for your Supervisor to know where you are at all times – especially during an "**Emergency**".
- The only person authorized to initiate a "**Stand Down**" is the incident commander or the General Manager or designate.
- **Failure to follow** proper Evacuation Procedures will result in Discipline.
- The following areas are considered "**Muster Stations**" (see Figure)

5.2 MEDICAL EVACUATION PLAN

In the event of serious injury, it may be necessary to remove the individual from the source of the danger and to administer emergency first aid. The Health Professional will be notified immediately in order to take charge of the situation and ensure the safe removal of the injured person to the first aid room if possible.

- The **ERT** team will respond with (Nurse / Medic) and assist as necessary with equipment, treatment etc.
- The (Nurse / Medic) and as many **ERT** team members as required will respond to the incident site. When the (Nurse / Medic) arrives at the scene, they will notify the First Aid Treatment Room.
- First Aid will be administered to casualty(s); the casualty(s) will be secured and transported to the First Aid Room. Vehicles transporting casualty(s) will have priority over any other vehicle on site.
- Once the "Mechanisms of Injury" and the patient's condition have been assessed, a decision will be made by the (Nurse / Medic) whether a Medevac is required and decide on ground or air transportation. There are guidelines to follow to make this determination.

- As per guidelines for transportation, the "Mechanism of Injury" and/or patient condition, the (Nurse / Medic) will contact one of the following Medical facilities:

Winnipeg Health and Science Centre

Trauma team **204-774-6511 or 204-787-3901**

Main ER doctor in charge **204-774-6511**

Baker Lake Health Centre - 867-793-2816

Churchill Hospital - 204-675-8881

Rankin Inlet Health Care Centre - 867-645-2816

In addition: Dr. Lee (AEM – MBK) Medical Director - will be notified.

If a **MEDEVAC** is required, the Health Care Provider, will call one of the following airlines::

- Baker Lake Medical Clinic (**867)-793-2816**
- Rankin Inlet Medical Clinic (**867)-645-2816**

The following **INFORMATION** will be relayed to **Medical Facility** that you have reached and to **MEDEVAC** dispatcher:

- Give Patient's Name, Age, Mechanism of Injury, Nature of Injuries, and Medical Condition. Give all tests, treatment which you have done as well as ALL of the medication that has been administered to patient including the patient's past medical history and medications that he/she is taking.
- The TRANSFER sheet should be included and if possible FAX: to the Health Care Facility who will be receiving the **MEDEVAC and patient.**

If a **MEDEVAC** is required and decision is made to go with one:

- The patient will STAY in First Aid Room until his/her **Condition is stabilized.**
- Unnecessary delays will be avoided in transportation of Patient to Receiving Health Care Provider.
- When **MEDEVAC** personnel arrive on site – they will help establish the patient for air transportation.
- (Nurse / Medic) will take instructions from Medical Director and act according to his/her instructions.
- All decision/interventions will be documented with time lines.

Depending on the **MEDEVAC** Company that has been chosen, the (Nurse / Medic) may have to escort the patient to the receiving Health Care Facility.

The Official In-Charge will notify the (Nurse / Medic) when the **MEDEVAC** has arrived and landed. The (Nurse / Medic) with the help of the **ERT** team will transfer the patient into the ambulance, to the aircraft.

If the **MEDEVAC** comes to site with a **Medical crew:**

- The **MEDEVAC** team will call ahead to notify their ETA.
- The Manager on Duty or designate will ensure that a vehicle is sent to the airstrip at the ETA.
- The **Medical crew** with their equipment will be brought to the First Aid Room.
- Once the **MEDEVAC** equipment is in place, the **ERT** team will assist the **MEDEVAC Medical crew,** and (Nurse / Medic) with the transfer of the patient to the ambulance, and into the aircraft.

After the aircraft has left AEM – MBK site, the (Nurse / Medic) will notify the receiving Medical facility with the ETA to their closest airport. The **MEDEVAC** pilot will advise receiving airport air traffic controller that an ambulance is required for transportation to receiving Medical facility.

All Operations type work will be suspended until (Nurse / Medic) are back in First Aid Room. The incident scene, materials, machinery, medical equipment etc. will remain undisturbed until the investigating team has conducted the investigation. This type of incident is considered a “Reportable Incident” therefore the Mines Inspector shall be notified (without delay). The Official In-Charge will be responsible for ensure that this occurs. Under no circumstances shall any person move, or otherwise interfere with any wreckage or equipment at the scene of a “reportable incident” until an inspector has conducted an investigation of the incident and has given permission to do so.

The Official In-Charge will make all necessary calls to the outside for notification purposes: I.e.: Corporate Office notification, Mines Inspector, RCMP, etc.

If the incident is of a fatality, it is CLEAR that the Coroner or in his/her absence, the RCMP are in total control of the incident scene. The scene is to remain undisturbed until orders have been issued by either of these two authorities.

The scene will then be released to the local authorities such as the Mines Inspector for their portion of the investigation.

Upon arrival of the aircraft to the airport of the Receiving Medical Facility (other than Baker Lake), the receiving team will be notified and a designated person will call the Incident Command (control center) and update them on their arrival and the next steps to be taken. I.e.: transportation to Receiving Medical Facility.

The Receiving Medical Facility will communicate with AEM – MBK Division (Nurse / Medic) on frequent basis to update site on patient’s condition and treatment. Such as surgery required,

As soon as steps have been implemented to properly attend to the injuries, the Incident Commander will notify the appropriate authorities of the accident by telephone, providing as much information as possible. A complete accident description and investigation form is required to be submitted as soon as possible. The accident description and investigation form will be completed and submitted by the General Mine Manager. Unless some action is required to remove an immediate hazard, the site of

any serious accident will be cordoned off and remain unchanged until clearance is received from the appropriate authorities.

5.3 AIRPLAN CRASH DISASTER

Emergency Response begins as soon as an air crash is identified or reported.

- When the Meadowbank Air Traffic Controller or Meadowbank Security is notified that an approaching aircraft is having difficulty, they will immediately notify the General Manager or Designate.

- In the event of reported air crash off-site the Meadowbank Air Traffic Controller or Meadowbank Security will notify the General Manager or Designate.

- Emergency Response procedure will be initiated if required for response by ERT

- The ERT Team on scene will make a preliminary assessment and notify the Nursing Clinic.

- The Nurse or Medic, with the ERT Team, shall establish triage, treatment, transportation, communication, and staging.

- The ERT Incident Commander will direct all emergency response actions, and assess the need for additional resources keeping the Command Post updated as to all actions

- The RCMP will establish access and traffic control and assist the Coroner in body recovery and identification, if necessary.

- The Incident Commander will instruct emergency response personnel to not move debris associated with the wreckage, ie. cargo, plane remnants, passenger belongings, unless there is imminent danger of items being destroyed, or unless they inhibit access to passenger rescue.

- The Coroner/RCMP is responsible for the identification, movement and/or removal of the fatality. Unauthorized personnel are not to move the dead without express approval of the Coroner/RCMP, except when there is a question of whether the person is deceased or if the body is in danger of being destroyed. In all cases involving the movement of a body, personnel moving the body shall make careful note of the location and condition of the body for the Coroner/RCMP.

- Upon notification of an air disaster, NAV Canada will be responsible for air traffic in proximity to the scene, with immediate regulatory control of airspace around the area.

They will keep the airspace clear of intrusive air traffic, to the limits of the regulations.

Recovery:

- Recovery immediately follows emergency response. It involves direction from the General Manager or Designate.

- Maintaining access control to the scene.
- Providing emergency social services (critical stress debriefing), for employees and rescue workers.
- Investigating the accident.
- Clean-up of the crash site.

5.4 PIPELINE BREAKAGE

Pipelines will be used to transport tailings solids, reclaim water, freshwater, and domestic sewage on site. Pipeline breakage could lead to localized, short-term smothering of vegetation, the release of poor-quality water, and potentially exposure of mine personnel to infectious or toxic substances. In the event of a pipeline breakage, the following actions will be taken as required and when it is safe to do so:

- Shut off the feed to the pipeline;
- Physically contain the spill through the construction of dikes, berms, sumps and collection ditches;
- Pump collected water to the tailings reclaim pond or sewage treatment plant;
- Collect and remove solids for disposal in the tailings facility, incineration, or off-site disposal at a licensed disposal facility; and
- Monitor for residual contaminants on land and in surface water.

A general response procedure for the handling of spilled domestic sewage (infectious substances) is provided in the Spill Contingency Plan.

5.5 TOXIC GAS RELEASES

In the event of a toxic gas release, the following actions will be taken:

- Immediately evacuate the area/building and notify the incident commander;
- If possible and safety permits, turn off the source of the gas and ventilate (i.e., open windows/doors to outdoors) the area;
- Isolate the area and restrict access to ERT personnel only; and
- Implement air quality monitoring.

For the mill, refer to the specific procedure *Toxic gas alarm emergency evacuation procedure*. A general response procedure for the release of compressed gases is provided in the SCP.

5.6 DIKE FAILURE

A detailed Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) will be developed to address the consequences of failure of any of the dikes on site. The procedure will be developed by the EMC and the Safety Superintendent with the assistance of the dike designer and Engineering Superintendent. Potential failure scenarios of the dikes and Tailings Storage Facility are provided in Appendix A.

5.7 EMULSION PLANT

A detailed Emergency Response Plan (ERP) was prepared by Dyno Nobel and addresses incidents and potential incidents involving the manufacturing, handling and storage of explosives and related products in Dyno Nobel Canada Inc.' magazines, emulsion plants and worksites at Meadowbank. The ERP for Dyno Nobel emulsion plant is provided in Appendix B.

5.8 BAKER LAKE MARSHALLING FACILITY

The Baker Lake Marshaling Facility is located 2 km east of the Hamlet of Baker Lake and is used for the interim storage of supplies, including hazardous materials, prior to being transported to the mine site. The fuel tank farm at the Facility is used for bulk fuel storage. Emergencies occurring at the Marshaling Facility will be handled according to the SCP.

SECTION 6 • REFERENCES

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Golder Associated Ltd. March 2007b. Final Report Detailed Design of Central Dike, Meadowbank Gold Project, Volumes 1 to 3.

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NWT Water Board. January 1987. Guidelines for Contingency Planning. Government of the Northwest Territories.

SECTION 7 • LIST OF ACRONYMS

AEM	Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited – Meadowbank Division
AWPAR	All Weather Private Access Road
CDA	Canadian Dam Association
DFO	Fisheries and Oceans Canada
ECC	Emergency Coordination Centre
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMS	Environmental Management System
EPP	Emergency Preparedness Plan
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
ERT	Emergency Response Team
FoS	Factors-of-Safety
GN	Government of Nunavut
HAZCOM	Hazard Communication
HMMP	Hazardous Materials Management Plan
HR	Human Resources
HSC	Occupational Health & Safety Committee
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICC	Incident Command Centre
INAC	Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
KIA	Kivalliq Inuit Association
MMER	Metal Mining Effluent Regulations
MSDS	Materials Safety Data Sheets

MSHA	Mine Safety and Health Administration
NWB	Nunavut Water Board
OHSA	Occupational Health and Safety Administration
OHSP	Occupational Health & Safety Plan
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
SCP	Spill Contingency Plan
TDG	Transportation of Dangerous Goods
TSF	Tailings Storage Facility
WCB	Worker's Compensation Board
WHMIS	Workplace Hazardous Materials Information Syste

APPENDIX A

Dike Failure Scenarios

A.1 Dewatering Dikes

A.2 Central Dike

A.3 Saddle Dams

A.4 Stormwater Dike

Appendix A.1

Dewatering Dikes

Dewatering Dike System

The Dewatering Dike System includes the East Dike and the Bay Goose Dike, as shown on the general mine site plan provided at the beginning of this document. The dike construction will involve the dumping of rockfill into water to create the shells of the dikes, excavation through rockfill and lakebed soils to bedrock, placement of granular filter and core materials, dynamic compaction, construction of the cutoff wall using slurry supported trench techniques and grouting of the bedrock and contact between the cutoff wall and bedrock using cementitious grout. The dikes will have crest widths in excess of 50 m and may be used as a one-way haul road.

The East Dike was constructed in 2008, with foundation grouting continuing into early 2009. The East Dike has a crest length of 700 m, excluding abutments, was constructed in water with a maximum water depth to bedrock at the cutoff of 7.2 m. The crest of the East Dike is at elevation 137.1 m and the average lake level along the dike is 133.1 m.

The dewatering dikes are considered high consequence structures, based on Canadian Dam Association (CDA, 2007) Dam Safety Guidelines. The dikes are relatively low, wide structures that exceed the minimum design criteria factors-of-safety (FoS) for stability for pre-drawdown conditions, operation conditions with maximum head difference across the dikes, pseudo-static earthquake conditions, and post closure conditions. Consequently, the probability of dike failure is considered to be low provided that the dikes are constructed according to the design. Mitigation against failure of the dikes includes a quality control and quality assurance program during construction, and an ongoing program of dike surveillance and monitoring during operations, as specified in the design.

East Dike

During operations, the East Dike separates the eastern portion of Second Portage Lake from the Portage Pit and the Tailings Storage Facility behind the Central Dike. Following closure, the East Dike will remain as a permanent structure that will separate Third Portage Lake (El. 134.1 m) from Second Portage Lake (El. 133.1 m) and maintain the existing water elevation difference of 1 metre.

The East Dike is approximately 720 m in length through an average water depth of approximately 2.3 metres, and a maximum water depth to bedrock of about 7.2 m. Crest width is approximately 55 metres. Minimum setback from the Portage Pit (distance between dike toe and pit crest) is greater than 170 metres.

Bay Goose Dike

The Bay Goose Dike separates the Portage Pit from Third Portage Lake. The Bay Goose Dike acts as a permanent structure to allow mining of the south end of Portage Pit and the Goose pit.

The Bay Goose Dike will be approximately 2 km long, and will be constructed in water depths less than 10 metres at the cutoff. Crest width varies between approximately 85 and 100 m. Minimum design setback from the Portage and Goose Pit is 70 metres.

Table A.1: Meadowbank Dewatering Dikes Summary of Consequences and Proposed Monitoring/Action for Rare Events Based on Water Retaining Embankment Failure Modes Identified in ICOLD Study (1995)

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Overtopping	(1) Lake level rise because of restricted outflow from Third Portage or Second Portage Lake (excessive inflow is a far less likely scenario).	Water spilling over the crest. The crest is wide and comprises coarse rockfill. Significant damage to the dike is not credible, based on performance of other rockfill structures subjected to overtopping or flow through events. Mining operations might need to be suspended, but there will be considerable warning time given the design freeboard and the storage volume within the lakes.	Lake levels should be part of safety information provided to mine management. Outflow channels should be inspected weekly during thaw, open water season, and during ice break-up. If overtopping is likely, a temporary spillway could be constructed and armoured to control and localize flow at shallow dike sections.
	(2) Dam crest settles more than 2m over a distance of (say) 50m or so. This scenario requires extensive loss of support in the foundation since the rockfill of the dikes is essentially not settlement prone itself. For foundation settlement of this magnitude to occur, a piping event must develop and which in itself might be a failure mode. Or, there would have to be an unexpected layer of compressible soil in the foundation.	Same as (1).	The situation envisaged in this scenario should develop slowly with crest settlement evident at least several weeks before a run-away event develops. Easily observed cracks should be evident. Monitoring of crest settlement is appropriate, and is included in the design. Rockfill and till available from the mining operation can be placed to raise the dike crest.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Internal Erosion	(1) Dike Section: Cutoff wall is defective, allowing high water flow across the wall. This defect occurs at a deep water location where the core backfill and filters are segregated and permeable; the combination allows erosion of the cutoff wall and increasing seepage.	The cutoff wall will develop a progressively increasing void ratio, thereby increasing the rate of water flow through the dike. This is not a catastrophic failure mode as the rockfill shoulders of the dike will be stable, and at its worst, would lead to temporary suspension of mining.	Monitor seepage from downstream face for rate of seepage, and for presence of sediment in seepage. Will become evident as localized intensive seepage at dike toe and can be repaired. May also see settlement in the cutoff wall. Will be most likely in deep water sections. Gradients across the cutoff wall in shallow water are not high enough to cause piping.
	(2) Dike Section: Cutoff wall loses bentonite because of improper construction.	Same consequences as erosion because of defect, as above.	Bentonite makes up 2% of the cutoff wall fill. Loss of this material will increase the permeability of the cutoff wall and increase the rate of seepage.
	(3) Foundation: Till is possibly non-uniform with more transmissive zones and not self-filtering. It is possible that one of these zones may align with defective construction of the core backfill and defective construction of the cutoff wall allowing high flows. Seepage could along the transmissive zone beneath the downstream rockfill section could erode the foundation tills at the downstream toe or into the downstream rockfill because of the lack of filtering.	Limited seepage at the toe or into the rockfill would accelerate into a large inflow, and could lead to the undermining of the dike if no action was taken. This is a credible catastrophic failure mode if increased seepage is not detected in time.	No particular instrumentation is needed as this failure mode will show itself as localized and increasing seepage. It could be detected by walk-over inspection by an experienced engineer or technician. Remedial action could comprise a reverse filter and rockfill buttress depending on location of the flow and configuration of the foundation, freezing, or grouting if identified in time. Quality control of cutoff is important, and most important for deep water sections. In the worst case, the pit may be deliberately flooded in a

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
			controlled manner, the cutoff repaired, and the pit dewatered.
Seepage within Embankment	Seepage on its own is not a credible failure scenario. The downstream rockfill shell has extremely high flow through capacity. The rockfill zone is both large and pervious, so that seepage will not daylight on the downstream face and lead to instability. Any seepage related failures must include internal erosion, see above.	No credible consequences. May require upgrade of the seepage collection system. May need to suspend mining activities while reducing seepage.	Seepage monitoring program.
Seepage within Foundation	Defective construction of cutoff leading to transfer of unexpectedly high fraction of the reservoir head into the downstream part of the dike foundation, or leading to a piping event as above.	This failure mechanism has caused embankment failures elsewhere because of straightforward pore pressure induced instability. However, it is unclear that it could cause failure of the Dewatering Dikes because of their large width compared to the retained water head. The most likely consequence is downstream toe slumping requiring a localized stabilizing berm before the crest roadway could be reinstated.	If this mechanism arises it should show itself during initial dewatering or very shortly thereafter.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Internal Conduit Rupture	There are no water offtake works or other structures extending through the dikes.	Not applicable.	Not applicable.
Slope Instability	(1) Normal Operation: The rockfill shoulders of the dike are wide and have high shear strength, making it a conservative design. Slope failure requires failure in the foundation and which would then extend into the overlying dike. Sliding failure is considered unlikely given the low horizontal forces generated by water and ice forces relative to the normal frictional force due to the weight of the dikes and the friction angles of foundation materials	A foundation failure would cause a rotational slip or sliding failure until equilibrium was reached. This mechanism would limit access along the dike until repaired. Failure through the rockfill shoulders will not necessarily compromise the water retaining function of the dikes. Failures which reach the core may cause failure.	This mechanism should develop during construction or dewatering, due to increase in load and associated pore water pressure increase. Initial stages of failure should be observable as tension cracks in the dike crest. Walk-over inspection of the dikes by a trained inspector is an appropriate monitoring strategy. Survey of crest, face, and toe is also appropriate. Stabilizing berms can be placed inside the dikes or through water along the upstream shoulder.
	(2) Earthquake Induced: Occurrence of an extreme earthquake, much in excess of the current understanding of seismicity of the area.	The extreme earthquake loading for this site is a low magnitude. Settlement of the dikes could occur in the event of a large earthquake. Dynamic compaction of the core during construction may have subjected the rockfill shells to accelerations equivalent to the expected earthquake loading. This would not be a failure situation. The crest is also erosion resistant for any earthquake induced wave action in the impounded water.	Dike inspection following earthquakes felt on site.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Failure of Cutoff Wall Due to Movement of the Dikes	Differential horizontal movement of dikes due to water or ice loading, or pit wall failure. Creates a breach in the cutoff wall. Ice and water forces are not credible due to the ratio of frictional forces generated by the self weight of the dike versus ice loads and water pressure. Pit wall failure involving the dike unlikely based on assessments of pit wall stability and setback distance between the pit and the dikes.	Large inflows through the breach. Pit would flood requiring suspension of mining activities. Potential for loss of life for workers inside dikes.	No enhanced monitoring. Prism monitoring program sufficient. If the pit floods, then repairs to cutoff would be done prior to dewatering.
Unexpected Settlements	Unexpected foundation soils consolidate during dike construction. A significant quantity of clay, that was not recognized during foundation excavation, would be required to generate settlement required for a water release event. Settlement of the core will be limited by dynamic compaction.	2 m of Core settlement would be required to allow water flow through the rockfill and over the settled core. This flow would not cause failure of the rockfill shells. It would also be readily repaired by placing more end-dumped till into the settled zone.	No enhanced monitoring required, as settlement would be apparent from prism monitoring data and visual inspection. Excessive settlements may be remediated by excavating rockfill above the core and placing more till. Soil conditions will be observed during construction, and design revised to accommodate actual conditions.

A.1.1 Failure Scenario during Operations

The 'worst-case' scenario for failure of the dewatering dikes during operations would involve a movement of the dikes that compromises the integrity of the cutoff wall. However, the rockfill has a very high flow-through capacity and a high strength and will not move unless the foundation is involved. The water will flow through the upstream rockfill first, then through the core and cutoff wall, and finally through the downstream rockfill berm. Flow through cracks opening in the foundation may erode the foundation soils and the core. The upstream rockfill will choke the flow to some degree, and flow will decrease once the downstream toe of the dike is inundated and the head difference across the dike begins to reduce.

Although this describes a 'worst-case' scenario, a catastrophic failure of the pit dewatering dike system is not considered a credible failure mode. Elements of the dike design, including the width of the dike section, and the inclusion of filters, in addition to the cutoff wall make catastrophic failure of the dike highly unlikely. However, for the purposes of this document, the effects of such a failure are described below.

Potential Effect

In the case of the East Dike, the worst-case scenario would be associated with the short portion of the dike through the deepest water along the alignment at the centre of the dike. In this area water depth is as much as 7 m to bedrock at the cutoff wall within the dike. This inflow could potentially result in loss of workers caught in flowing water. Breach of the East Dike would be unlikely to trap workers in the pit when access ramps are on the west side, opposite the inflows. Breach of the East Dike would result in cessation of mining, either temporarily or permanently.

Upon completion of the East Dike and dewatering of the northwest arm of Second Portage Lake, there will be approximately 17 million m^3 (Mm^3) of water remaining in Second Portage Lake. If the segment of dike at the deepest portion were suddenly removed, flow from Second Portage Lake into the pit would continue until the elevation of the lake drops by several metres, at which time the current lake bottom would be exposed and would act as a barrier to flow towards the pit. This scenario is the worst in the final year of pit operation when pit volume is the largest. The volume of water associated with this drawdown would be on the order of about 10 Mm^3. Some erosion of the till between the pit crest and dike toe would be expected, so the depth of water loss from the lake may be larger, but this would take some time to fully develop.

Inflow to the pit could expose large amounts of shoreline and shoal habitat around the lake. Water flowing into the pit could entrain suspended solids and dissolved constituents from the dike material and pit walls. If necessary, the water could be retained within the pit and diked area and would be amenable to treatment (e.g., particle settling, in-situ amendment) before discharge, should it be required.

The ecological effects of the exposure of shoreline and shoal habitat on fish and fish habitat would be to temporarily eliminate spawning areas and result in reduced water quality from exposure of sediment to wave and wind induced erosion. The effect of this would last approximately one year as inflow from Third Portage Lake to Second Portage Lake averages 10 Mm^3 annually (AMEC, 2003). Presuming that the dike breach is repaired, water levels in Second Portage Lake would rise over the spring and summer to return to pre-breach elevations and would re-fill the lake in the event of a 'worst-case' scenario.

In the case of the Bay Goose Dike, the worst-case scenario dike breach that could allow the greatest amount of water inflow would be associated with the southeast segment of the dike through the deepest water along the alignment. In this area, water depth is as much as 20 m deep at the cutoff, and the pit could be as deep as 130 m. This inflow could potentially result in loss of workers caught in flowing water. Breach of the Goose Island Dike would be unlikely to trap workers in the pit when access ramps are on the northwest side, opposite the inflows. Breach of the Goose Island Dike would result in cessation of mining of the Goose Pit, either temporarily or permanently.

In the unlikely even that such a failure of the Bay Goose Dike were to occur, the rate and volume of water entering the downstream pit would depend on the magnitude of the breach and the length of time to repair the breach. Third Portage Lake has an estimated volume of the lake is 446 Mm^3 (Golder, 2006). The final volume of Portage Pit (30.0 Mm^3) is roughly 6.7% of the volume of the lake, while Goose Pit (14.8 Mm^3) is approximately 3.3% of the volume. In the case of a catastrophic breach of the Bay Goose Dike, the estimated Third Portage Lake water level drawdown would be approximately 1.0 m and 0.5 m, respectively assuming that the failure occurs when the pits are completely excavated and a complete filling of the pits. These estimated worst-case scenario changes in water level are comparable to the mean average annual difference between high and low water (0.3 m) on Third Portage Lake.

There would be a small impact to fish and fish habitat in Third Portage Lake in the event of a 0.5 m to 1.0 m drop in water level. Areas used for spawning may be slightly nearer to the ice cover and a small amount of habitat might be vulnerable to freezing. Water quality within the pit would be temporarily impaired from an increase in suspended and dissolved solids, although water quality would return to near background during the first winter as sediment would settle under the ice cover.

Mitigation, Management, and Monitoring

A major cutoff breach scenario due to pit wall movement, while possible, has a low probability of occurrence. If foundation movement was sufficient to compromise the cutoff wall, then the core backfill would act as a semi-permeable element and limit flow. Water would first need to flow through the rockfill shell, the core backfill, the damaged cutoff wall, and then through more of the core, filters, and the downstream rockfill. Provided that the downstream filter elements against the rockfill shell are properly constructed, then migration of the core and cutoff wall into the rockfill will not occur. Some additional seepage may occur due to failure of the cutoff wall; however this would be noted during regular monitoring. Mitigation could be by jet grouting, freezing, or installation of sheet piling through the cutoff wall.

The use of appropriately graded filters in the design of dikes and dams is standard engineering practice, and is the key to preventing internal erosion. The dike design includes the use of a two zone filter on the upstream face of the pit side rockfill. During the construction of the dikes a quality control and quality assurance program will be undertaken.

Routine visual inspection of the dikes will be conducted on a regular basis to document any changes in the dikes.

During the operation of the dike, a series of monitoring instrumentation will be installed, including:

- Thermistors to monitor the thermal regime in the dike and foundations;

- Slope inclinometers and prisms to monitor deformations within the dikes; and
- Piezometers to measure pressure and to infer flow through the dikes.

Piezometers downstream of the cutoff wall would be monitored for pressure changes as the pit is deepened. Increasing pressure would indicate that less head loss is occurring across the seepage cutoff, which might indicate that a crack has formed, permeability is increasing, or the pit is experiencing inflows from some other potential flow pathway. The instrumentation will be monitored to identify any potentially problematic areas relating to dike instability. Mitigation measures for seepage and piping could include:

- Additional pressure grouting of bedrock materials;
- De-pressurization wells;
- Construction of a slurry cutoff wall within the core just upstream of the suspected seepage area;
- Jet grouting of the core and foundation in the suspected seepage or crack area;
- Construction of a cutter soil mixing (CSM) wall in the suspected crack area;
- Freezing;
- Installation of toe drains; and
- Construction of interceptor ditches within the down-stream overburden materials.
- Allow pit to flood, install new cutoff under no-flow conditions, then dewater and resume mining.

Specific monitoring and mitigation strategies will be developed as part of an Operations Plan for the de-watering dikes.

A.1.2 Failure Scenario during Closure

At end of mine life, once the water quality of the pit lake has been determined to be suitable for release, a portion of the south end of the Bay-Goose Dike will be removed resulting in a hydraulic connection between the Goose/Portage Pit Lake and Third Portage Lake. The East Dike will be the only dike that will remain in service. The elevation of the pit lake will be equal to Third Portage Lake. The elevation difference between the pit lake and Second Portage Lake will be approximately 1 m. Consequently, there will be a low hydraulic gradient from the pit lake towards Second Portage Lake. During the closure and post-closure period, the natural central and east channel outlets that connect Third Portage to Second Portage Lake will continue to carry the entire flow between the two lakes.

Potential Effect

A breach of the East Dike would create an additional outlet and cause water to leave the Portage/Goose pit area and spill into Second Portage Lake at a greater rate, partly at the expense of flow from the central and east channel outlets. This would cause a rise in water level in Second Portage Lake and a reduction in level in Third Portage Lake. The additional water would flow through the channel connecting Second Portage Lake to Tehek Lake until the water elevations in Second and Third Portage lakes equilibrated.

In the event of such a scenario, water would flow from Third Portage Lake, northward through the pit lake area, and then east through a potential East Dike breach and into Second Portage Lake. There is a naturally large outlet capacity via the connecting channel from Second Portage to Tehek Lake. Water residence time in Second Portage Lake during and after mine development is less than one year. Thus, in the event of an East Dike breach, any additional water added to Second Portage Lake would leave the system relatively quickly. Given the flow-through nature of the lake there would be little net change in Second Portage Lake volume or lake elevation as water would easily be absorbed into the much larger Tehek Lake.

Drawdown of Third Portage Lake would be limited, given the large size of the lake (33 km^2) and the constriction points within the system that would slow drawdown. Specifically, the magnitude of drawdown in the event of a breach would depend on the magnitude and depth of the breach, time of year (winter ice cover would prevent loss of water), response time, flow rate (i.e., the loss of water depends on the location of the breach and friction through the system), and the outlet capacity of Second Portage Lake. For example, total annual average discharge from Third Portage to Second Portage Lake is approximately 10 Mm^3 with a mean annual difference in water level between spring and fall of 0.3 m. Given the large size of Third Portage Lake, a breach resulting in the loss of 10 Mm^3 of water, which is equivalent to an entire open water season of runoff through all discharge channels would result in a drawdown of only about 0.3 m. Maximum drawdown would be one metre.

Reductions in water level would therefore be small and have only minor impacts to fish habitat in Third Portage Lake. Adverse impacts to water quality would not be expected given that water quality within Goose/Portage pits is expected to be very high.

Mitigation, Management and Monitoring

Internal erosion of the cutoff wall could result in increase of the rate of water flow through the East Dike. However, this is extremely unlikely due to the low hydraulic gradient across the East Dike (~ 1 m of head difference) and filter effect of the core backfill. Such a scenario is more likely to occur during the operational phase of the East Dike when the hydraulic gradient across the dike section is much higher, though in the opposite direction. If such a scenario were to occur, it would not be considered a catastrophic failure mode due to the stability of the rockfill shoulders comprising the outside structural elements of the dike.

A breach in the East Dike during closure could be managed by the placement of material to reduce the flow of water and reduce potential erosion of the till core. The hydraulic gradient across the dike at closure is low. The dike could be repaired and hydrologic conditions restored without any danger to the overall stability of the dike, provided annual monitoring is carried out following closure.

Appendix A.2

Central Dike

Tailings Storage Facility

The Central Dike system is comprised of a Central Dike, a series of perimeter dikes, and the natural basin of the northwest arm of Second Portage Lake, as shown on the general mine site plan provided at the beginning of this document. The Central Dike cross-section consists of:

- A rockfill embankment, constructed from run-of-mine waste rock, placed in lifts and compacted, with the upstream face designed at 1.5H:1V or flatter and the downstream face designed at a 1.5H:1V slope;
- An upstream two zone granular filter;
- A bituminous liner with appropriate cover on the upstream face;
- An upstream cutoff through the foundation soils to bedrock; and
- A grout curtain through the fractured bedrock zone (at this time it has been assumed that the fractured bedrock is up to 20 m deep, based on available geotechnical drilling information along the dike alignment).

The Central Dike is a high consequence structure, based on Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA, 2007). Slope stability analyses show that the dike will meet or exceed design FoS for stability under static and pseudostatic earthquake load conditions. Consequently, the probability of failure of the Central Dike is considered to be very low.

Table A.2: Meadowbank Central Dike Summary of Consequences and Proposed Monitoring / Action for Rare Event Based On Water Retaining Embankment Failure Modes Identified in ICOLD Study (1995)

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Overtopping	(1) Pond Level rises because of restricted outflow (excessive inflow is a far less likely scenario). Water will spill at the low point on the dike system, which will depend on the construction schedule.	Water spills over the crest but, as this crest is both wide and comprises coarse compacted rockfill, minimal damage to the dike is credible. There will be considerable warning time prior to overtopping given the design freeboard and the storage volume.	Adjust decant and/or deposition rate. Add spillway in Central Dike, Saddle Dam, or natural ground.
	(2) Dam crest settles more than available freeboard over a distance of (say) 50m or so. This scenario requires unexpected foundation condition, such as glacial lake clay deposit. Settlement would occur upon placement of rockfill during dike raise construction. Freeboard is greatest immediately after a raise and this scenario is therefore unlikely to occur.	Water and tailings spill over crest and if settlement was rapid might erode the crest. Travel of tailings will be dependent on volume of water available, and level of thaw. Tailings would only go to the pit, and not reach the lake.	The situation envisaged is unlikely. This scenario would develop slowly during construction of the dike. Crest settlement would be evident at least several weeks before an overtopping event occurred. Easily observed cracks should be evident during summer period, but could be hidden during the winter. Systematic crest settlement monitoring is appropriate, and included in the design. Production and addition of tailings to the Tailings Storage Facility could be stopped to maintain freeboard. A spillway could also be constructed. The tailings deposition plan maintains a long beach between the dike and the pond, which provides additional freeboard to overtopping of the dike by pond water.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Internal Erosion	(1) Dike Section: Upstream bituminous liner contains defects arising from undetected damage during installation. May lead to loss of water, but filter retains tailing.	Loss of water into the rockfill. This is not a catastrophic failure mode, because the rockfill of the dike will be stable, and at its worst, would lead to temporary suspension of mining. Plus the bituminous liner does not propagate a tear like a plastic liner, so undetected damage is typically small and does not grow. Also, foundation slopes down towards the tailings, so seepage impounds in the rockfill and will tend to reduce further seepage	Not necessary to monitor directly. Will become evident as possible seepage at dike toe. QA/QC program during construction is the main defence against this scenario.
	(2) Dike Section: Upstream bituminous liner contains defects arising from undetected damage during installation. This defect occurs at the same location as a filter defect.	Loss of tailings and water into the rockfill. This is not a catastrophic failure mode, because the rockfill of the dike will be stable, and at its worst, would lead to temporary suspension of mining. Accumulation of ponded water within the rockfill would decrease the head difference driving flow, thereby limiting the potential for a catastrophic failure.	Not necessary to monitor directly. Will become evident as possible intensive seepage at dike toe, and potentially as tailings fines within seepage downstream of the toe. QA/QC program during construction is the main defence against this scenario.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Seepage within Embankment	Seepage on its own is not a credible failure scenario. The rockfill is pervious so seepage will not daylight on the downstream face. Flow through the rockfill will not lead to instability. Any seepage related failures must include internal erosion, see above.	No credible consequences.	No scenario specific monitoring required.
Seepage within Foundation	If the till foundation had a zone of more pervious soil (e.g. gravel seams) and the more pervious zone was preferentially exposed to water pressure, then normal seepage would transmit an unexpectedly high fraction of the reservoir head into the downstream part of the dike foundation. This scenario requires construction defects in filters, liner, and cutoff trench fill.	This failure mechanism has caused other embankment failures elsewhere because of straightforward pore pressure induced instability. However, it is unclear that it could cause failure of the Central Dike because of its large width compared to the retained water head. The most likely consequence is downstream toe slumping requiring a localized stabilizing berm.	If this mechanism arises it should show itself gradually as the tailings and water level increase in the basin by build up of pore water pressures in the foundation. This would be detected during routine monitoring of piezometers installed in the foundation. Pressure relief wells could be installed in the foundation during operations. The tailings deposition plan maintains a long beach between the pond and the dike. This will reduce seepage gradients beneath the dike. In addition, the tailings act as an upstream blanket on the bottom of the TSF to limit seepage into the foundation.
Internal Conduit Rupture	There are no water offtake works or other structures extending through the dikes.	Not applicable.	Not applicable.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Slope Instability	(1) Normal Operation: The rockfill has high frictional strength and the design widths make it conservative. Slope failure requires failure in the foundation, which would then extend into the overlying dike.	A foundation failure would cause a rotational slip or sliding failure until equilibrium was reached. This mechanism would limit access along the dike until repaired. Failure through the rockfill will not necessarily compromise the tailings or water retaining function of the dike.	Initial stages of failure should be observable as tension cracks in dike crest and movement at dike toe. Walk-over inspection of dikes by a trained inspector is an appropriate monitoring strategy. Survey of crest, face and toe is also appropriate. If movements associated with increases in foundation pore pressures, then construction could be stopped or staged to allow pore pressure dissipation. Placement of rockfill as a downstream toe berm could help prevent failure.
	(2) Earthquake Induced: Occurrence of an extreme earthquake, a very rare event.	The extreme earthquake loading for site is a low magnitude event. A large earthquake would not be expected to cause a catastrophic failure, rather the dike would settle. The Central Dike rockfill is placed in the dry and compacted, and will therefore have limited settlement. This would not be a failure situation. The crest is also erosion resistant for earthquake induced wave action in the impounded water.	No monitoring is necessary. Dike should be inspected following any earthquakes felt on site.

Failure Mode	Scenario	Consequence	Monitoring/Action
Liner Failure Due To Foundation Movement	Differential horizontal movement of the dike due to pit wall failure. Creates a breach in the liner and filter. Pit wall failure is unlikely based on assessments of pit wall stability and the setback between the pit and the toe of the dike. Also, the liner and rockfill can withstand significant deformation, making this an unlikely scenario.	Tailings and water escape into the dike rockfill, but pond there because the foundation slopes towards the dike, rather than the pit. It is noted that the tailings pond is operated approximately 500 metres away. Rapid escape of water will therefore be limited.	No enhanced monitoring. Prism monitoring program and visual inspection sufficient. Movement would be evident in setback area between dike and pit. Tailings at face of dike may be excavated to allow repair of liner, or placement of filter material. Other options include freezing tailings at face of dike.
Unexpected Settlements	The foundation till is expected to consolidate during construction and operations. There is no credible mechanism for a large degree of unexpected settlement following construction required to eliminate freeboard and release tailings/water.	A large settlement could lead to water flowing through the rockfill, but this would not cause failure of the rockfill. It could also be readily repaired by placing more end-dumped rockfill, and extending the liner, in a manner similar to the periodic raise.	No enhanced monitoring required, as excessive settlement would be apparent from prism monitoring data, and visual inspection.

A.2.1 Failure Scenario during Operations

In the case of failure of the Central Dike during operations, the 'worst-case' scenario would involve a flow of unfrozen water and tailings in association with a catastrophic failure of the dike in the later stages of mining when personnel and machinery are working in the open pit directly down-stream of the Tailings Storage Facility (TSF).

Potential Effect

The failure of the Central Dike could result in the sudden release of dike material and tailings from the TSF into that portion of the Portage Pit immediately adjacent to the dike. This could potentially result in loss of life. This would result in cessation of mining activities, either temporarily or permanently.

There would be no effect on the receiving environment water quality, fish or fish habitat because tailings would be contained within the pit and the dewatering dikes and the area would not yet be flooded.

Mitigation, Management and Monitoring

The calculated FoS for this failure mode, under static and pseudo-static conditions, are above design criteria in the Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA, 2007). Consequently, the probability of such a failure developing is low. Based on the tailings deposition plan, it is expected that the tailings pond will typically be 500 m or more from the face of the Central Dike. Furthermore, thermal modeling indicates the tailings and Central Dike will be frozen or partially frozen, and that the facility will tend to the frozen state in the long term. Therefore, a catastrophic failure of the Central Dike without some form of prior dam distress providing a warning of deteriorating conditions is not considered a credible catastrophic failure mode.

Mitigation against such a failure mode occurring will be to construct the Central Dike to design so that it is physically stable under all loading conditions. A comprehensive quality control and quality assurance program will be undertaken during dike construction to confirm foundation conditions, material type and quality, and to adjust designs as necessary to accommodate actual or unexpected conditions found at site.

A management plan will be developed for the operation of the tailings facility, and will include appropriate operational controls and monitoring activities. During operations, instrumentation will be installed to monitor not only the physical performance of the Central Dike itself, but also the performance of the TSF. The instrumentation to be installed include:

- Thermistors to monitor the thermal regime in the dike and foundations, and deposited tailings;
- Prisms to monitor deformations within the dike; and
- Piezometers to measure pressure and to infer flow through the dike and foundation materials.

If necessary, the stability of the foundation materials and of the dike during operations can be enhanced through the construction of a stabilizing toe berm or through freezing.

A.2.2 Failure Scenario during Closure

In the case of failure of the Central Dike during or following closure, the 'worst-case' scenario would involve a catastrophic failure of the dike and the release of tailings into the lake.

Potential Effect

Failure of the Central Dike during or following closure is not expected to result in loss of life, as mining operations will have finished.

Under this scenario, a catastrophic failure of the Central Dike could result in the sudden and unexpected release of dike material and tailings into the Portage Pit lake area. This could potentially produce a wave of sediment laden water that could over-top the East Dike.

Such a scenario would destroy fish habitat along the dike face and smother benthic habitat outwards from the failure area. Suspended solids and dissolved metals would increase in the water column and would cause displacement of fish and possible toxicity of some bottom sediments, depending on how much tailings material was lost. The new face would be subject to chronic erosion of fine tailings material until such time as a new, stable dike face could be established. Failure of the dike would not cause a change in water level. Impacts would be localized because the Central Dike is situated in the upper part of a blind arm of the lake with an extremely limited drainage area and low turnover. Consequently, transport of suspended sediment away from the area would be restricted and the area of impact would be relatively small.

Mitigation, Management, and Monitoring

The calculated FoS for the Central Dike design are greater than design criteria for post closure for static and pseudo-static (earthquake) conditions. Consequently, the likelihood of a failure occurring is low. Furthermore, thermal modeling indicates the tailings and Central Dike will progressively freeze, and that the facility will tend to the frozen state in the long term. Freezing will increase dike and tailings stability and decrease tailings mobility, and therefore this is not considered a credible catastrophic failure mode.

Mitigation against such a failure mode occurring will be to construct the Central Dike to the design so that it is physically stable under static and pseudo-static loading conditions, and to monitor during the mine life to assess the overall performance of the dike and the TSF. Data gathered during the operational period of the TSF can be used to re-evaluate the performance of the Central Dike structure in the context of longer term stability post closure.

Appendix A.3

Saddle Dams

Saddle Dams

Six Saddle dams will be constructed around the limits of the tailings basin. The saddle dam locations are shown on the general mine site plan provided at the beginning of this document. The saddle dams will be constructed by dumping a rockfill berm with a crest width of 30 m to allow haul truck traffic. The Saddle Dams will be re-sloped, with a minimum 6 m crest width. The downstream face will be angle of repose, or 1.32H:1V (Horizontal:Vertical), and the upstream face will be 3H:1V. The Saddle Dams will have an upstream two-zone granular filter and a liner. There is a potential for release of either attenuation water, reclaim water, or tailings to Third Portage Lake in the event of an overtopping or catastrophic failure..

A.3.1 Failure Scenario during Operation

Depending upon the phase of operations, breach or complete failure of a Saddle Dams could result in the uncontrolled release of Attenuation Pond water, Reclaim Pond water or tailings to Third Portage Lake. There is also the possibility of the Saddle Dams to be overtopped through the formation of a wave resulting from a slope failure within the Portage Waste Rock Storage Facility and the sudden release of waste rock into the TSF.

A tailings beach will be formed on the toe of each Saddle Dams. As a result, the Reclaim Pond will be pushed away from the Saddle Dams. As the tailings and Saddle Dam are expected to freeze, and freezing will reduce the chance of tailings reaching Third Portage Lake, failure of the Saddle Dams at with release of tailings to Third Portage Lake is not considered to be credible.

An overtopping or breach failure of the section of the Saddle Dams located just south of the intersection with the Stormwater Dike could potentially result in flow of Reclaim Pond water and/or tailings toward Third Portage Lake.

<u>Potential Effect</u>

Should an overtopping event or breach occur in a Saddle Dam water flowing toward Third Portage Lake would consist of Reclaim Pond water which is predicted to exceed Metal Mining Effluent Regulations (MMER) guidelines for a number of constituents.

As a worst case of failure resulting in a dam breach, the total predicted Reclaim Pond volume of 0.75 Mm^3 could be released towards Third Portage Lake. The Saddle Dam would not be expected to fail due to overtopping. This failure mode is not expected to release a considerable volume of water to Third Portage Lake. Given the size of Third Portage Lake, the impacts to water quality and on fish from a release of Reclaim Pond water would likely be localized.

A worst case scenario would also involve the flow of non-frozen tailings into Third Portage Lake. The distance between the toe of the Saddle Dam and Third Portage Lake is on the order of 150 m to 300 m. Such a scenario would destroy fish habitat and smother benthic habitat outwards from the failure area. Suspended solids and dissolved metals would increase in the water column and would

cause displacement of fish and possible toxicity of some bottom sediments, depending on how much tailings material was lost.

Mitigation, Management, and Monitoring

The dams are designed according to Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA, 2007), and will be constructed under controlled conditions. A comprehensive quality control and quality assurance program will be undertaken during construction to confirm foundation conditions, material type and quality, and to adjust designs as necessary to reflect actual conditions found at site. The dams are predicted to eventually freeze, which will enhance stability. Therefore, failure of Saddle Dam by overtopping, full breaching or foundation and slope failure is not considered to be credible.

With respect to slope stability failure, the Saddle Dams are constructed of rockfill, which has high shear strength. Slope stability failures must therefore occur through foundation soils. The calculated FoS for slope stability failure modes through foundation soils are above design criteria in the Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA, 2007) for static and pseudo-static conditions. Consequently, the probability of such a failure developing is low.

The tailings are expected to freeze, and freezing will reduce the chance of tailings reaching Third Portage Lake. The distance from Saddle Dam 1 to Third Portage Lake is about 300 m at its closest point. Leaks of supernatant water and or tailings from the South Saddle Dam would be most likely to occur during operations. Leaks would be visible, and could be mitigated during operations.

A.3.2 Failure Scenario during Closure

At closure Reclaim Pond water will be pumped to Portage pit, the basin behind the Saddle Dams will be drained and filled with run-of-mine, acid-buffering ultramafic waste rock. The rock is expected to freeze over time. Failure of the Saddle Dam following closure is not considered to be credible. Further, the lack of water will reduce mobility of tailings if failure occurs.

Potential Effect

No effects to water quality, fish or fish habitat is expected.

Mitigation, Management, and Monitoring

As described previously, the dams will be designed meet Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA, 2007). The dams will be constructed under controlled conditions. During the construction of the dams a comprehensive quality control and quality assurance program will be undertaken to confirm foundation conditions, material type and quality, and to adjust designs as necessary to reflect actual or unexpected conditions found at site. Monitoring during operations will ensure the South Saddle Dams perform as intended. The dams will eventually freeze, which will enhance stability. Therefore,

post-closure failure of the Saddle Dams by full breaching or foundation and slope failure is not considered to be credible.

Appendix A.4

Stormwater Dike

Stormwater Dike

The Stormwater Dike is located at the northwest end of Second Portage Lake, within the TSF as shown on the general mine site plan provided at the beginning of this document. The location of the Stormwater Dike was selected to optimize the storage capacity of the main tailings basin, and of the Portage Attenuation Pond. The dike will separate the tailings basin from the Attenuation Pond until approximately Year 4, at which point the Reclaim and Attenuation ponds will combine. At the end of mine life, any remaining water will be treated within the TSF and released once discharge criteria are met.

The Stormwater Dike will be constructed using rockfill, with south face slope of 3H:1V, and a north face slope at angle of repose for rockfill. The minimum crest width will be 6 m. The dike will have a filter zone placed on the south face, underlying an impermeable element of bituminous geomembrane. The maximum height of the dike will be about 13 m. At the maximum cross section, the width of the base of the dike will be approximately 95 m.

A.4.1 Failure Scenario During Operation

If slope failure of the Stormwater Dike were to occur when tailings are at their maximum elevation in the main tailings basin, and if the tailings are not frozen, this could potentially result in the sudden flow of tailings into the Attenuation Pond area. This in turn could potentially result in the development of a wave which overtops the South Saddle Dam at the northwest end, releasing tailings and reclaim water to Third Portage Lake.

Potential Effect

A breach or failure of the Stormwater Dike may cause a wave-induced overtopping of the Saddle Dam at the northwest end. The Saddle Dam would not be expected to fail due to a single overtopping wave event.

This failure mode is not expected to release water to Third Portage Lake. The distance between the toe of the Saddle Dam and Third Portage Lake is on the order of 150 m, so tailings would likely settle out. The potential impacts on Third Portage Lake water quality, fish and fish habitat would likely be minor, localized and short-lived.

Mitigation, Management, and Monitoring

The Stormwater Dike was designed to meet Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA, 1999). The upstream side slopes were designed to allow machine traffic, and are therefore highly conservative with respect to slope stability. The dike will be constructed in the dry under controlled conditions. During the construction of the dike a comprehensive quality control and quality assurance program would be undertaken to confirm foundation conditions, material type and quality, and to adjust designs as necessary to reflect actual conditions found at site. The dike will eventually freeze, which will enhance stability. Therefore, failure of the dike due to overtopping is not considered to be credible.

A.4.2 Failure Scenario during Closure

The Stormwater Dike will be covered by tailings during operations and will not exist at closure.

Potential Effect

There will be no environmental effect on the receiving environment.

Mitigation, Management, and Monitoring

None required.

APPENDIX B

Emergency Response Plan for Dyno Nobel Emulsion Plant

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

Meadowbank Mine Site.

Magazine, Plant and Work Sites

This Emergency Response Plan (ERP) addresses incidents and potential incidents involving the manufacturing, handling and storage of explosives and related products in Dyno Nobel Canada Inc.' magazines, plants and worksites. This ERP has been developed for Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. and all of it's wholly-owned subsidiaries (DNX Drilling). Actions detailed within this plan are compulsory, under the approval and authorization of DNCI's Regional Operations Managers.

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Publication/Amendment

Date	Changes To Prior Edition	Pg.
15 Oct 03	**New document**	All
26 Apr 04	**Amendment # 1**	
	Renumbering of Appendices 6 – 13	App. 7 – 14
	Miscellaneous Typos & Amendment Dates	All
17 March 08	Amendment #2	
	Updated Contact information	
	Addition of definitions	
	Included Calling and responding emergency procedures	
	Addition Duties of Key personnel	
	Addition of response to Natural disasters	
	Addition of visitor and contractors access control -	
	Replaced the Appendices and renumbering	
	Included a Emergency Report form	
	Addition of Nitric acid, Aluminum and Diethylene glycol and CFE	
	Addition of alternate methods of communication	
	Addition of Reportable Substance list	
	Miscellaneous Typos & Amendment Dates	All
August 18, 2010	Amendment #3	
	Updated Scope and ERP Outline	
	Added Sign-off sheet for Annual Fire Department Review	
	Added Appendix for Employee Training sign-off	
	Updated Reporting Incidents Flowchart	
	Updated procedure for Raw Material Truck Spills	
	Updated Bomb Threat Checklist	
February 14, 2011	Amendment #4	
	Updated site contacts	
	Updated site evacuation & Muster locations	
July 14, 2011	Amendment #5	
	Updated site contacts	
	Updated site evacuation & muster loaction (Map drawn)	
	Site specific emergency procedures	

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1.0 SCOPE

This document provides a Work Site Emergency Response Plan covering fire/explosion, spills, security breach, bomb threat, evacuation and prescribed actions that employees must take to ensure employee and public safety in the event of an emergency. The general reference to DNCI's "Work Sites" throughout this document includes magazines, plants and miscellaneous work locations.

The Emergency Response Plan appearing on Dyno Nobel Canada Inc.' database is a controlled document. Uncontrolled copies of this ERP are provided to customers and associates who own the land on which DNCI's worksite is located, plus applicable municipal and regulatory authorities. As well, uncontrolled copies are issued to all Company employees and are placed in all central offices and Company delivery vehicles.

2.0 RELATED DOCUMENTS

The following documents also relate to emergency situations that can arise and should be held at each Work Site:

- Federal, Provincial and Municipal regulations, standards and guidelines
- Corporate Policies plus HSE Management System Standards & Procedures
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's)
- Dyno Nobel General and Specialized Work Rules
- Material Safety Data Sheets
- Prime Contractor's / Customer's ERP
- Transportation ERAP #2-1037
- Crisis Communication Plan

3.0 ERP OUTLINE

3.1 The following materials are covered by this ERP:

Fuel Oil
ATF Hydraulic Fluid
Ammonium Nitrate Prills and Solution
Sodium Nitrite
Sodium Thiocyanate
ANFO
Emulsion
Packaged Explosives
Detonators
Diethylene glycol

3.2 The following situations are addressed in this ERP:

- Fire / Explosion
- Storage Tank Failure
- Spills from Product Delivery Trucks
- Spills from Raw Material Delivery Trucks
- Process Spills
- Shut down due to weather, floods, lightning, fires, explosions and other threats to the security and operation of DNCI's facilities, equipment and material.
- Bomb Threats
- Quantities of spills and reportable to Dyno Nobel and authorities

3.3 This ERP covers:

Preparation	Reporting
Training	Waste Disposal Permits
Lines of Authority	Containment
Notification	Inspection
Decontamination	Maintenance

3.4 The following definitions apply to this plan:

DNCI Corporate contact : A DNCI corporate employee who is assigned to receive Emergency Calls at all times from the answering service.

ER Advisor: Emergency Response Advisor (ERA), who will normally be the applicable General Manager, Area Manager, or Technical Advisor who will liaise with First Responders.

OSC: (DNCI) On Scene Coordinator, the Senior DNCI employee at an incident site who manages and controls DNCI resources in support of First Responders and incident recovery.

ERT: Emergency Response Team, DNCI personnel dispatched to an incident site to assist First Responders and conduct incident recovery under the direction of the OSC.

4.0 PREPARATION AND PLANNING

4.1 In order to provide competent emergency response at Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. magazines, plants and worksites, first responders (local fire departments and mine rescue personnel) must be thoroughly briefed on an annual basis of the potential hazards involved in a Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. worksite fire. To this end, Work Site Supervisors must take fire department plus mine safety and security representatives on an annual magazine/plant tour to view:

Explosives Storage Areas	Evacuation (Meeting) Area
Bulk Emulsion Equipment	Communications Equipment
ANFO Blending Area	Facility Layout
Fire Fighting Equipment Sites	(Waste) Burn Facilities

A record of each explosives worksite tour and the names of the first responder representatives attending are to be documented and kept on file.

Annual Fire Department Review Form (Appendix 9)

4.2 All DNCI employees shall review this ERP on an annual basis and participate in ERP drills / exercises when scheduled.

4.3 All worksite accidents involving fire, explosion, reportable spills/emissions, breaches of security and bomb threats are to be reported to applicable authorities and senior management. As per incident reporting procedure

4. 4 Spill procedures for each of the materials listed in section 3.1 are outlined in Table 6-3. All procedures specify: Method of Cleanup, Method of Disposal and Protective Clothing. Based on the procedures presented in Table 6-3, worksite supervisors must ensure that adequate clean-up equipment and materials are readily available and in good condition.

4.5 Worksite information for each of DNCI's facilities is contained in the attached appendices. The ERP is revised whenever significant changes are made.

4.6 Current Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are to be kept at each Work Site for all hazardous materials that are stored and handled at the Work Site. Copies of current product MSDS' are also made available to customers and landowners. Obsolete MSDS' will be replaced as new ones are issued.

4.7 Each Work Site will hold and maintain in good repair, appropriate fire fighting and spill control equipment for potential emergencies. Fire extinguishers, hoses and other fire fighting equipment are to be visually inspected on a monthly basis to ensure Magazine, Plant, Work Site and delivery vehicle readiness.

5.0 TRAINING

5.1 All employees will complete training on the contents of this Plan during their "new hire" orientation and review the plan annually.

5.2 A trained person is considered to have reviewed all related documents (Section 2.0), to have been instructed on the use of related equipment and procedures, and to have discussed with their Supervisor or trainer, questions and issues of concern.

5.3 Training records, including certificates for training completed, are to be kept onsite in the Employee's Training Record.

5.4 The Magazine, Plant or Work Site Supervisor/Manager will certify their employees as having received training by signing the training form. In signing the training form, the Supervisor / Manager will have satisfied themselves that trained employees are able to:

- Recognize fire and explosive hazards for the materials and processes to which they are exposed /involved with;
- Competently use Fire Fighting / Fire Protection Equipment (Note: employees should receive refresher training in the use of fire extinguishers at least every three years)
- Competently use applicable personal protective equipment (PPE) when handling hazardous substances;
- Recognize and be familiar with substances which become hazardous wastes when spilled; and
- Follow SOP's and use established work practices to minimize the potential for fires, explosions, environmental releases and other accidents.
- Worksite Managers / Supervisors will ensure that all contractors receive a worksite orientation before commencing work or being left unaccompanied in the worksite. Following the orientation process, the contractors will be required to sign off on the Contractor Checklist acknowledging training in the applicable areas including the site emergency response plan.

- All Plant & Magazine sites will have in place, a continuous (24 hour) access control system to control the entrance, presence and exit of visitor and contractors and their equipment and materials
- Employees must be trained on Reportable Quantities to the Government in the unlikely event of a spill.
- All employees are aware of evacuation routes, muster point location, and all-clear notice procedure.
- New/Transferred employee or Annual Refresher sign-off form located in Appendix 8

6.0 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND LINES OF AUTHORITY

6.1 GENERAL

Reporting Incidents Flow Chart (Following page)

Table 6-1
Emergency Response Flow Chart




Within 24 hours
Recordable/Potentially Recordable Incident?
NO
If No, Do Not Call Incident
Recordable Incidents or Potential Recordable Incidents
Transportation Emergency Response
Damage more than $20,000
Blasting or Fly rock Incident
Yes, Not Sure?
Contact Incident Report Line
1- 888-547-3966
(1-888-KIS-DYNO)
Press: "1 " and report: Actual or Potential MTIs, RWIs, LTIs, Transportation Emergency, Blasting or Fly Rock Incidents, Environmental Spills, Property Damage over $20,000

Within 72 hours
Supervisor or Manager
Complete ICARUS Report & Submit to HSE Professional & Operations Manager
Complete Investigation and RCA with Help of HSE Professional

SITE SUPERVISOR/DELAGATE
EXPERIENCING EMERGENCY / POTENTIAL EMERGENCY

- **CALL FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE**
  In the event of an emergency, accidental release or imminent accidental release involving explosives, eliminate potential sources of detonation where possible (eg. turn off the ignition of a vehicle), call **6911** (or the local emergency number) for immediate assistance, **call the site Supervisor/Area Manager** and initiate the site's Emergency Response Plan. If normal phone systems are down other methods of communication can include two way radios, satellite phones, pager, e mail and vehicle satellite tracking systems.

- **WARN PUBLIC WITHIN EVACUATION DISTANCES IF RISK OF DETONATION**
  Should there be explosive detonations, or the risk of detonations due to the presence of fire or other detonating factors, advise the First Responders (or anyone within the immediate vicinity if First Responders are not at the scene) of the risk and applicable safety distances per Table 6-4, page 17 (liaise with Emergency Response Advisor (ERA) if time permits). Help organize perimeter guards to prevent people from entering the evacuation zone.
  Note: See ERP, page 17 Table 6-4 for Evacuation Procedures.

- **ASSIST LOCAL AUTHORITIES**
  Assist First Responders and Local Authorities in eliminating the emergency situation, and liaise with DNCI's On-Call Employee / ERA until relieved by the Company's Emergency Response Team (ERT).

TO RESPOND TO AN EMERGENCY CALL

DNCI Corporate contact instructions:

Upon receiving a call for emergency response assistance, keep a log of all subsequent communications and actions, and do the following:

1. Immediately obtain the name and callback number of the caller, in case the telephone line is lost.

2. Obtain information as fully and accurately as possible following the emergency report form (see appendix 1).

3. Call an ER Advisor for the applicable Region (see appendix 2) and report the emergency situation. In turn, the ER Advisor will phone the emergency scene caller, establish ongoing contact, assess the emergency, determine what Company resources and/or contracted emergency response services are required and organize an Emergency Response Team – ERT to proceed to the emergency scene if required.

4. Assist the Emergency Response Advisor (ERA).

5. Liaise with Company Executive / Senior Managers.

Emergency Response Advisor (ERA) instructions:

1.Call the Branch/Plant Supervisor nearest the emergency scene plus territorial & federal authorities (see applicable appendix to Annex D) to advise them of the situation and the need for an emergency response.

2. Designate, assemble and dispatch an Emergency Response Team (ERT), made up of Groups 1 & 2 personnel (see ERAP pg. 16 and Annex D) under the leadership of an On Scene Coordinator (OSC), if required.

3. Authorize the dispatching of additional resources, communications, transportation and contracted services as necessary.

4. Contact and instruct the designated Emergency Response Team (ERT) to proceed to the emergency scene with the required vehicles and equipment.

5. Liaise with the Person in Charge of the Emergency) and/or Local Authorities to obtain a situation update.

6.Advise Local Authorities as appropriate, regarding the properties, hazards and handling procedures for the explosives involved in the emergency. In particular, advise the Local Authorities of appropriate evacuation distances per Table 6-4 pg. 17.

7. Continue to consult with the Local Authorities as appropriate, plus the Company's On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), to stabilize and eliminate the emergency.

8. Refer to **Regional Manager** *(Tom Medak, Willard Pierce, Dale Bodnarchuk or Francois Lambert)* for any media requests in accordance to the Crisis Communication Plan (CCP). Media contacts shall be through Regional Manager designated for the area.

9. Contact the explosives supplier and / or transporter (if other than DNCI) to advise them of the emergency and to request their assistance if/as required.

ON-SCENE CO-ORDINATOR (OSC)

- The On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is the Company's representative and local authority in charge of all company actions and resources at the emergency scene. Once the OSC arrives at the emergency scene, the ERA will transfer communication with First Responders/Local Authorities to the OSC. In turn, the OSC will liaise with the ER Advisor as required. Throughout the Company's emergency response, the OSC will ensure that First Responders and Company personnel (employees and contractors) observe all safety and regulatory standards and procedures.
- The OSC may revise / adjust the composition of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) and supporting resources as required. The OSC may, in consultation with the ER Advisor, contract commercial services to assist in addressing and resolving the emergency situation.

- The OSC will oversee the Company's local involvement with emergency services, government (municipal & provincial) and public interests until the emergency is fully resolved. Post-emergency activities (clean-up, restoration, etc.) under the direction of the Environment Manager may be delegated to an appropriate Branch, Plant or Area Manager. **EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT)**

- Selected emergency response personnel will take their direction to assemble and proceed to the emergency scene from the ERA or their representative. Team members will immediately report to the On-Scene-Coordinator.

- The primary role of the ERT is to provide a competent and trained / certified workforce plus specialized equipment and material to assist First Responders / Local Authorities in the stabilizing and elimination of an 'explosives emergency', and to retrieve / recover, repackage and remove to safe and secure storage, non-detonated explosives.

- While at the emergency scene, ERT members will take their direction from the Company's OSC and remain available until released by the OSC.

NOTE:

ONLY INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING AS REQUIRED UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS GOODS (CLEAR LANGUAGE) REGULATIONS, OR WHO ARE WORKING UNDER THE DIRECT AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION OF AN EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN TRAINED FOR CLASS 1 DANGEROUS GOODS UNDER TDG, MAY PARTICIPATE IN SITE CLEAN-UP ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PICKING UP, REPACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL.

6.1.1 In any emergency the Work Site Supervisor/Manager or their delegate must take certain actions, including the following:

- Call local fire/emergency authorities (at mine sites, also call Mine Fire, Safety and Security if different and give relevant information).
- Account for all employees and visitors. Arrange for Rescue of anyone who may be trapped, without endangering oneself or others.
- Notify Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. ERA's so that necessary arrangements can be made for technical / administrative support, including accident reporting and investigation plus continued/alternate production. The following information should be provided and refer to appendix 1:

What Occurred	Time of Occurrence
Action Taken	People Contacted
Status of Situation	Anticipated Follow-up

6.2 FIRE & EXPLOSIVES

6.2.1. There are three categories of fire that may involve explosives:

I. Fires Directly Involving Class 1 Explosives and Blasting Agents

- **DO NOT FIGHT THE FIRE.** Instruct all fire fighters on the scene not to fight fire with explosives.
- Shut off power at main breakers if possible. At mine sites, call Mine Security or Fire/Rescue. At all other DNCI locations call local Fire/Rescue personnel.
- Evacuate all personnel from the Work Site to the safe meeting place as outlined in the Work Site Appendix.
- Set up a communications base at the meeting place and guard
- against anyone entering the area.

II. Fires Involving Components For Manufacture of Blasting Agents

Bulk blasting agents may be in the form of emulsion or ANFO. ANFO is a mixture of prilled ammonium nitrate and fuel oil.

Under conditions of large mass, intense heat, confined dust / vapor buildup, and the right mixture combination of the basic ingredients, emulsion and ANFO will explode. The probability of explosion with

ammonium nitrate (AN) alone is very small, but increases when under intense heat and confinement. Table 6-1 includes recommended fire fighting procedures for each of these substances.

III. <u>Fires Involving Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. Trucks</u>

In cases where the Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. delivery trucks are in a building that is on fire, if there is no explosives and safe to do so, may be moved provided access to the truck and exit from the building is not barred by flames or smoke, with available fire extinguishers with caution only if the fire is small and not in the storage compartment.

Fires on re-pump or other bulk explosive delivery vehicles shall not be fought if the fire involves the explosives compartment. Fire fighting measures should be taken immediately to prevent any fire such as a tire, electrical or cab fire from reaching the explosives compartment.

Fires on other transport vehicles may be fought with caution. Fires that cannot be controlled sufficiently to avoid involvement of the vehicle's fuel compartment shall be left and personnel evacuated to a safe distance.

6.2.2. When a fire is small and does not involve any explosive agents, it may be fought with plant extinguishing equipment. If the fire is widespread and intense, all personnel, including visitors and contractors should be evacuated to the meeting area outside the main gate.

Table 6 - 2
FIRE FIGHTING INFORMATION

MATERIAL	RECOMMENDED FIRE-FIGHTING METHODS	SPECIAL CONSIDERATION
Ammonium Nitrate Prill – Odorless white to light tan crystaline solid	Use flooding amounts of water in early stages of fire. Keep upwind. AN is an oxidizing agent which supports combustion and is an explosive hazard if heated under confinement that allows high-pressure buildup. Ensure good ventilation and remove combustible materials if it can be safely done. Evacuate to designated area if fire cannot be controlled.	Toxic oxides of nitrogen are given off during combustion. Fire fighters require self-contained positive pressure breathing apparatus. Avoid contaminating with organic materials. Many powdered metals such as Al, Sb, Si, Cd, Cr, Co, Cu, Fe, Pb, Mg, Mn, Ni, Sn, Zn and brass react violently and explosively with fused AN below 200˚C Sensitivity to detonation increases when heated.
Ammonium Nitrate Solution- Colorless/Odourless Liquid – white paste like solid when cooled	Use flooding amounts of water in early stages of fire. Cool containing vessels with flooding quantities of water until after fire is out	Material will not burn, but thermal decomposition may result in flammable/toxic gases being formed. These products are nitrogen oxides and ammonia. (NO,NO_2 NH_3). Product may form explosive mixtures when contaminated and comes in contact with organic materials. Explosive when exposed to heat or flame under confinement. Avoid temperatures over 210°C (410°F) A self contained breathing apparatus should be used to avoid inhalation of toxic fumes
Sodium Thiocyanate – White solid - odourless	Use extinguishing media most appropriate for the surrounding fire	Wear self contained breathing apparatus – MSHA/NIOSH approved or equivalent, and full protective gear. During a fire, irritating or highly toxic gases may be generated by thermal decomposition or combustion.
Sodium Nitrite – Oxydizing agent - white to light yellow crystals- faint odour	Flammability class – not regulated. Flood with water only – Isolate materials not involved in the fire and cool containers with flooding quantities of water until well after the fire is out.	Self contained apparatus should be worn in a fire involving Sodium Nitite.Thermal decomposition will cause reddish brown nitrogen oxides to be released.
Fuel Oil (No. 2 diesel) Dyed or pale yellow liquid with petroleum odor; and/or ATF Fluid	Use water spray to cool fire-exposed surfaces and to protect personnel. Shut off fuel from fire. Use foam, dry chemical or water spray to extinguish fire. Avoid spraying water directly into storage container due to danger of boil-over.	Avoid strong oxidizing agents.

Explosive emulsions, ANFO, packaged explosives and firing devices.	**Fire involving explosive materials must never be fought. Evacuate the incident scene. Do not confine (ventilate to prevent / reduce pressure build-up if safe to do so).**	Explosion hazard.
Enviro CFE	Dry chemical, foam, water spray (fog). Use water spray to cool exposed surfaces and containers	OIL FLOATS ON WATER. Do not use direct or heavy water stream to fight fire. Use organic vapour respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus to fight fire.

Table 6 - 3
CONTROL MEASURES FOR FIRE

MATERIAL	RECOMMENDED FIRE-FIGHTING METHODS	SPECIAL CONSIDERATION
Diethylene glycol	Small fire: type ABC dry chemical or CO_2 fire extinguisher. Large fire: water fog.	Keep away from oxidizers (nitrates and perchlorate). Explosion hazard if heated under confinement.

EVACUATION PROCEDURES

Advise the first emergency responders at the scene (police or fire) of the need to evacuate using the guidance in the Emergency Response Plan. Employees at the scene should assist local emergency services to the best of their ability to accomplish this. For incidents within a worksite such as a mine, quarry or construction operation, in most cases access is radio controlled. The quickest way of alerting people, therefore, is by site radio. Clearly state your location, situation and call for assistance in evacuating the area.

DO NOT FIGHT EXPLOSIVES FIRES. EVACUATE THE AREA AND LET THE FIRE BURN ITSELF OUT.

THE MINIMUM EVACUATION DISTANCE IS AS OUTLINED IN TABLE 6-4 (Pg. 17) FOR ALL DIRECTIONS (which is based on a higher traffic / risk / population density within the area, without benefit of protective features such as berms and hills. (**Transport Canada requires 1,600 meters for situations that involve high-risk surroundings**) upon determining actual quantity of explosives refer to Table 6-4 as per ERD quantity of distances.

Table 6 - 4
EVACUATION DISTANCES
Based On Amount of Explosives Present

Explosive Quantity		Metric Distance		English Distance
250 kg		70 Meters		230 Feet
500 kg		100 Meters		320 Feet
1,000 kg		150 Meters		500 Feet
2,000 kg		240 Meters		800 Feet
5,000 kg		400 Meters		1,300 Feet
7,000 kg		450 Meters		1,450 Feet
10,000 kg		480 Meters		1,550 Feet
20,000 kg		700 Meters		2,300 Feet
40,000 kg		800 Meters		2,640 Feet
60,000 kg		870 Meters		2,860 Feet
80,000 kg		960 Meters		3,150 Feet
100,000 kg		1040 Meters		3,420 Feet
120,000 kg		1100 Meters		3,610 Feet
>120,000 kg		1600 Meters		5,250 Feet

6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASES

6.3.1 Procedure For Fuel Oil Storage Tank Failure

- Assess the magnitude of the leak.
- If the leak is slow and the source can be determined, take the appropriate action to prevent further leakage.
- Transfer fuel from storage tank into drums if necessary.
- Collect spilled material, including contaminated soil, with absorbent pads or inert solid absorbent and store in drums labeled for disposal.
- If the leak is large and further leakage cannot be prevented, allow the dyke to fill. Transfer to drums, label for reuse or disposal, and store.
- Inspect empty tank to identify failure/cause of leak and repair tank.

6.3.2 **Procedure For Raw Material Truck Spills**

- Identify the material involved, assess the magnitude of the spill or leak and assist the driver to take appropriate action to stop the leak, taking care to prevent run off and/or entry into any water course or drainage system near the spill site.
- For AN prill, shovel spilled material into drums, label for reuse or disposal, and store. Use a non-sparking shovel to transfer spilled material into lined drums.
- For spilled fuel, contain by dyking with earth. Collect spilled fuel with absorbent pads or solid inert absorbent, transfer into drums, label and store for disposal.
- Remove contaminated soil for disposal in conformance with Environment Canada standards.

6.3.3 **Procedure For Process Spills**

- Identify the material involved and assess the magnitude of the spill or leak, taking care to prevent run off and/or entry into any watercourse or drainage system near the spill site.
- For AN prill, shovel spilled material into drums, label for reuse or disposal, and store.
- For spilled fuel, contain by dyking with earth. Collect with absorbent pads or solid inert absorbent, transfer into drums, label, and store for disposal.
- In the case of leaking bags of ANFO, sweep or shovel the spilled material into a clean drum or other suitable container, label for reuse or disposal, and store.
- Remove contaminated soil for disposal in conformance with Environment Canada standards.
- Have any process equipment (pumps, process lines, parts, gauges, etc.) involved in a leak or spill inspected and repaired or replaced. Re-inspect and test if necessary after repair is affected.

6.3.4 **Procedure For Emulsion Tank Failure**

- Assess the magnitude of the leak.
- If the leak is slow and the source can be determined, take the appropriate action to prevent further leakage.
- Transfer remaining emulsion from leaking storage tank into another storage tank, a tanker trailer if available, or into drums as necessary.
- Collect spilled material using double diaphragm pump(s) and store in labeled drums for reuse or disposal at the mine.
- If the leak is large and further leakage cannot be prevented, allow the room to fill. Transfer to drums, label for reuse or disposal, and store.
- Inspect empty tank to identify failure/cause of leak and repair or replace the tank

6.3.5 **Procedure For Fire**

- In the event of a raw material or product fire, take care to protect all persons from exposure to smoke and gaseous emissions from the fire.
- Potential toxic gaseous emissions from fires involving explosive materials include:

  Oxides of Nitrogen
  Carbon Monoxide
  Cyanide Gas

- All fires must be reported to local authorities and Mine Site Security as soon as possible.
- Self contained breathing apparatus is required for fighting a fire in the plant.
- Follow procedures outlined above for any spills and leaks resulting from fire when it is safe to do so

Table 6 – 5
ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE PROCEDURES

MATERIAL	SPILL AND LEAK PROCEDURES	WASTE DISPOSAL
Ammonium Nitrate Prill (odorless white to light tan crystalline solid)	Remove source of heat and ignition. Sweep or shovel spill into a clean, non-combustible container. Wash remaining trace residues with water. Wear rubber gloves and safety glasses to minimize contact with skin and eyes.	Re-use if possible or give it to a farmer as a fertilizer. If not possible, dispose of as-is in approved. Remove as much as possible the spilled material as a solid.
Ammonium Nitrate Solution-Colorless/Odourless Liquid – white paste like solid when cooled	Small spill - Dike and contain spilled material. Ensure spilled material does not enter sewers, wells or water courses. Allow to solidify. Use appropriate tools to place in container for disposal. Larger spill - Dike and contain spilled material. Ensure spilled material does not enter sewers, wells or water courses. Notify downstream water users. Allow to solidify. Use appropriate tools to place in container for disposal.	Call for assistance for disposal. Ensure disposal complies with regulatory requirements and regulations.
Fuel Oil (dyed or pale yellow liquid with petroleum odor)	Eliminate any source of ignition. Prevent spills from entering watercourses or drainage systems. Contain with sand or earth. Recover with pump or inert absorbent material into clean container. Wear safety glasses and rubber gloves to prevent contact with the eyes and skin.	Dispose of recovered material in approved landfill or other waste disposal facility.
ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil)	This material is an explosive. Remove all sources of heat and ignition. Transfer into clean plastic container with a plastic shovel. Label drums. Wear rubber gloves.	Recycle product, if possible. If not practical, explode it inside a borehole or burn it in an authorized burning ground.
Emulsion	This product is a blasting agent. Remove all sources of heat and ignition. Prevent spills from entering watercourses or drainage systems. If large amount of emulsion is involved, contain spill with earth or sand found locally. Recover spilled material with a diaphragm pump. Use of a diaphragm pump also requires an air compressor. Limitation of the pump suction is approximately 2.5 meters, pump discharge is approximately 8 meters. Use a screening device on pump suction hose. Out of area spills will require taking two pumps and extra hose. Transfer the product into a tanker trailer or clean 200 liter drums. If small amount of emulsion is involved, transfer material into a clean plastic container with a plastic shovel. Label tanker trailer or drums. Wear rubber gloves and rubber boots.	Recycle product, if possible. If not practical, explode it inside a borehole or if large amount is involved, demulsify it with liquid detergent.

Enviro CFE	Eliminate any source of ignition. Prevent spills from entering watercourses or drainage systems. Contain with sand or earth. Recover with pump or inert absorbent material into clean container. Wear safety glasses and rubber gloves to prevent contact with the eyes and skin.	Dispose of recovered material in approved landfill or other waste disposal facility.
Sodium Thiocyanate – White solid - odourless	Ensure adequate ventilation whe handling Sodium Thiocyanate. Keep containers closed when not in use. Wear appropriate PPE – eye protection, gloves and appropriate clothing to prevent skin exposure.	Vacuum or sweep up material and place into a suitable disposal container. Avoid run off into storm sewers and ditches which lead to waterways. Not regulated as a hazardous material. Chemical waste generators must consult appropriate hazardous waste regulations to ensure complete and accurate classification.
Sodium Nitrite – Oxydizing agent - white to light yellow crystals- faint odour	In the event of a spill or leak, contact the vendor (403-263-8660) for advice. Wear respirator, protective clothing and gloves. Vacuuming is the recommended method to clean up spills. Do **not** sweep or use compressed air for clean up. Recover spilled material on non-combustible material, such as vermiculite. Use non-sparking tools and place in covered containers for disposal. Any recovered material mau be used for it's intended purpose , depending on contamination.	Dispose of the waste material at an approved hazardous waste treatment/disposal facility.
Acetic Acid – Colourless liquid with a pungent odour	Wear appropriate PPE – evacuate downind areas as required to prevent exposure and to allow fumes and vapours to dissipate. Prevent entry into sewers or streams. Dike if needed. Eliminate all sources of ignition. Neutralize the residue with sodium carbonate or crushed limestone. Absorb win an inert dry material and place in an appropriate container for disposal. Flush area with water to remove trace residue.	Waste disposal must be done in accordance with provincial and federal regulations. Empty containers must be recycled or disposed of through an approved waste management facility.

6.4 SECURITY

6.4.1. In the event of a breach of security at a Dyno Nobel Canada Inc. Work Site, a call is to be made to the RCMP / local Police Department at the discretion of the Supervisor/Manager, or their delegate. In the case of a breach of security, Dyno Nobel Canada Inc.' HSE, Regulatory Affairs and Executive / Senior Management shall also be informed immediately and provided with the same information as outlined in Section 6.1

6.4.2. Any person(s) apprehended during the course of a serious security breach shall be detained until the Police arrive (note: employees are not to put themselves at undue risk by attempting to apprehend or restrain a potentially violent person).

6.5 BOMB THREAT

6.5.1. The safety of employees and the public is of primary concern. A person receiving a bomb threat over the telephone should attempt to remain calm and keep the caller talking by asking the questions listed in Table 6-6 (ERP pg. 20). Recording (writing) as much information about the caller and their comments is also very important for future reference. If possible, alert a co-worker to the situation while talking to the caller.

6.5.2. The police / mine security should be advised of the bomb threat as soon as possible. Unless there is good reason to the contrary, all personnel should evacuate the Work Site and await the arrival of the police / first responders at the designated meeting area. Suspicious objects should be reported but not tampered with and other people should be prevented from entering the Work Site until the local authority has authorized a return to the Work Site. Employees should be prepared to assist local authorities in their search / inspection of the Work Site as necessary.

Table 6 - 6
CONVERSATION GUIDELINES IN THE EVENT OF RECEIVING A BOMB THREAT

See Appendix 7

6.6 LINES OF AUTHORITY

6.6.1 Based upon the information available at the time of the incident, the Work Site Supervisor/Manager, in consultation with others (such as DNCI Senior Management, Mine/local authorities and/or Dyno Nobel advisors), will evaluate the incident and proceed with appropriate steps to implement this ERP. A decision on when to return to the scene of a serious incident will be made in like fashion, subject to approval by public authorities overseeing the incident.

6.6.2 The Work Site Supervisor/Manager will have overall responsibility for the implementation of this ERP and the supervision of all Company activities. Public authorities and the site owner have ultimate authority regarding the resumption of normal production activities.

7.0 NOTIFICATION AND REPORTING

7.1 Any incident that activates this ERP shall be documented on the DYNO Incident (Cintellate) Report. The Corporate Emergency Response Advisor must also be notified and in turn will advise the:

HSE Manager Vice President Operations
Area Manager

It is the responsibility of the HSE Manager or his delegate to report the incident to DYNO's HSE Management Team. A major incident involving a fire with emissions and/or a hazardous material spill shall be reported to a provincial Environment Officer under the direction of the Environmental Manager. Major incidents shall also be reported to the Chief Inspector, Explosives Branch, Natural Resources Canada; a Provincial/Territorial Safety Officer; and as applicable, an Emergency Measures Official.

Any incident which involves a spill at a Mine Site shall be immediately reported to the Mine Site Environmental Representative, and followed up with a copy of the incident report when complete.

7.2 Spills and Releases – Reportable and Significant Classifications

1) Determine if the spill/release is reportable

All environmental incidents are to be input into Cintellate. Reportable spills/releases are not only input into Cintellate, but the investigation and corrective action sections of Cintellate must be completed. To assist in determining if a spill/release is reportable, a listing of common materials with assigned reportable quantities is referenced (see Appendix 5, Reportable Substance List). The reportable quantities utilize the most stringent "reportable quantity" in Canada. Even if the spill/released material is recovered, the media impacted by the spill/release may be reportable to authorities (e.g., a portion of a spill reaching a source of drinking water or wetland). In addition, a spill/release is reportable if the amount equals or exceeds the Dyno Nobel Default Threshold.

2) Determine if the spill/release is significant

- Significant spills/releases are disclosed in the company's annual report. Significant spills/releases trigger time-critical internal actions as required by the company's procedures (crisis communication, internal investigation, etc)

The following table is provided to assist in making these determinations:

Reporting of Environmental Spills

Is the spill reportable?

- Yes if above a Reportable Quantity
- Yes if oil sheen is visible or sludge/emulsion is deposited beneath water surface
- Yes if water quality standards are exceeded
- Yes if from a UST exceeding 25 gallons or result in a sheen

Is the spill significant?

- Yes if authorities implement a national contingency plan
- Yes if "sensitive" environmental features have been impacted
- Yes if neighbors are evacuated
- Yes if authorities and/or neighbors file complaints and/or demand response activities
- Yes if financial impact is >US$100K
- Yes if media coverage is adverse.

7.3 Internal investigation reports will include:

- Name, work address, and phone number of the investigating (reporting) individual
- Identification and quantity of the released substance
- Time, duration, and location of the release
- Nature and quantity of injuries, property damage, production loss, administrative penalty and/or legal liability
- Precautions taken during the incident
- Relevant environmental conditions
- Corrective actions taken at the time of the incident
- Recommended corrective actions to prevent future occurrence

7.4 Senior Management shall be immediately informed by telephone of any major incident that requires Government notification as per Dyno Nobel's reporting procedures.

7.5 Major incidents involving explosive material shall also be reported to the Chief Inspector, Explosives Branch, and Natural Resources Canada by the applicable Regulatory Affairs Coordinator.

Table 7 – 1
REPORTABLE SUBSTANCE QUANTITY LIST

Material Released	Reportable to Authorities		Dyno Nobel Default Threshold (Proposed)
	If Recovered	If Unrecoverable/ Abandoned / Disposed	
AN Solution	Not Reportable if it can be used as a product	45 Kg (100 lbs) as released oxidizer (not media specific)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
	44 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	45 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	
	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	
AN Prill	Not Reportable if it can be used as a product	45 Kg (100 lbs) as released oxidizer (not media specific)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
	45 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	45 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	
	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	
Sodium Nitrite	45 Kg (100 lbs)	45 Kg (100 lbs)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 1mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 1mg/L-N)	
Fuel Oil	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	225 Kg (500 lbs); 261 L (69 gallons)
	State Regulations - Varies from Any Amount to specific Trigger Amounts	State Regulations - Varies from All Spills to specific Trigger Amounts	
	95 L (25 gallons) from UST	96 L (25 gallons) from UST	
Mineral Oil	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	225 Kg (500 lbs); 261 L (69 gallons)
	State Regulations - Varies from Any Amount to specific Trigger Amounts	State Regulations - Varies from All Spills to specific Trigger Amounts	
	95 L (25 gallons) from UST	96 L (25 gallons) from UST	

Emulsifier Agents	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	225 Kg (500 lbs); 261 L (69 gallons)
	State Regulations - Varies from Any Amount to specific Trigger Amounts	State Regulations - Varies from All Spills to specific Trigger Amounts	
ANFO	Not Reportable if it can be used as a product	45 Kg (100 lbs) as released oxidizer (not media specific)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
	45 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	45 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	
	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	
	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc.	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc.	
Emulsion	Not Reportable if it can be used as a product	45 Kg (100 lbs) as released oxidizer (not media specific)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
	44 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	45 Kg (100 lbs) for ammonia if released into water	
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 10mg/L-N)	
	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	Report if released to aquatic ecosystem (NH3 toxic to fish)	
	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	Reportable if sheen on surface of pond, stream, etc. or sludge within such	
Ethylene Glycol	2250 Kg (5000 lbs)	2250 Kg (5000 lbs)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
Sodium Thiocyanate	45 Kg (100 lbs)	45 Kg (100 lbs)	225 Kg (500 lbs)
	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 1mg/L-N)	Report if released to Drinking Water (DW std at 1mg/L-N)	

8.0 DECONTAMINATION

8.1 DNCI's Standard Operating Procedures and safety rules establish work practices that minimize employees' direct and indirect contact with hazardous substances.

8.2 Equipment, rubber boots, gloves and clothes that have been contaminated can be washed with soap and water. Wash water should be collected and disposed of in an approved manner with other contaminated material.

9.0 WORKSITE CLOSURE / SHUT DOWN

9.1 **Plant Shutdown (use appropriate lock-out/tag-out procedures)**

- In the event that a plant is shut down due to weather, flood, or other adverse situation, the Plant Manager / Supervisor or his delegate will ensure that all non-essential power is shut off. The Plant Manager / Supervisor will secure all valves and flow devices so as to prevent accidental opening.
- The Plant Manager / Supervisor shall determine if any raw material or raw material storage will be contaminated or at risk of fire/explosion, and take steps to move the material or isolate it from the contamination / hazard source.
- If the power and/or gas will create a dangerous situation the Plant Manager / Supervisor will cut the outside supply of power, thereby isolating all plant equipment.
- The Plant Manager /Supervisor will advise local Mine authorities of the plant shutdown and preventative actions taken.
- All sensitive documents must be secured.

9.2 **Magazine Closure (use appropriate lock-out/tag-out procedures)**

- In the event that a magazine is closed due to weather, flood, or other adverse situation, the Supervisor/Manager or his delegate will ensure that all non-essential power is shut off. Also, the Supervisor/Manager will ensure that all magazines and compound gates are locked before leaving the site.
- The Supervisor/Manager shall determine if any products or raw materials will be contaminated and take steps to move the material or isolate it from the contamination source.
- If power and/or gas will create a dangerous situation the Supervisor/Manager will cut the outside supply of power, thereby isolating all magazine equipment.

10. RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTER

Hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, slides, forest fires, and earthquakes, have the ability to damage or destroy everything in their path. Yet much of the

damage or destruction associated with such phenomena is the result of some secondary event, e.g. fallen power lines, ruptured tanks valves, pipes etc. If reasonable warning of an approaching disaster is received, efforts can be made to minimize damage by taking specific preventative measures. These measures are outlined in the following procedures.

1.Consult the Site Supervisor for guidance and proceed according to his direction.
2. If so directed, notify key personnel regarding the action being taken.
3. Collect important files, records and papers for safekeeping.
4. Open main electrical breaker to cut off all power to the site. (The main breaker is marked for easy identification).
5. Secure all buildings and equipment and lock the site gate.
6. Evacuate the site taking mobile equipment to safety.
7. Post Guards on site access routes to monitor the activities of unauthorized personnel.
8. A report of the incident must be submitted to the Area Manager within 24 hours.

10.1 PREVENTIVE MEASURES

10.2 **Waste Disposal Permits**

If nitrate waste is generated, a disposal permit must be obtained and kept up to date if the product will be disposed of off-site, or in mine tailings. Permits to dispose of other collected waste in the event of spills or leaks (such as described in Section 6.3) must also be obtained in consultation with mine / provincial environmental representatives

10.3 **Liquid Containment**

All fuel / oil storage tanks must be dyked according to the provisions of Federal and/or Provincial regulations (eg. National Fire Code, Environmental Protection Act), or have a double-walled tank.

A plan must be in place and materials on hand to create a dyke in the event of a large fuel or solution leak or spill or other emergency spill situation.

10.4 **Inspection**

All site emergency storage areas and equipment must be inspected monthly by qualified personnel, monthly for physical condition and serviceability, and the results recorded according to quality and safety standard operating procedures.

All recommendations/orders made by NRC Explosives Branch inspectors, Fire Marshals and insurance inspectors must be responded to and acted upon accordingly. Copies of their reports are to be forwarded to DNCI's HSE representative for the region.

10.5 **Maintenance**

All preventive and breakdown maintenance must be carried out and recorded in accordance with standard operating procedures.

11.0 WORK SITE START UP (Restoration of Business)

11.1 Before startup, the condition prompting the shutdown / closure must be over / corrected (i.e. flood, fire, explosion or blizzard).

11.2 All decontamination procedures must be followed and the site cleared and cleaned of any environmental waste hazards.

11.3 All repairs to plant equipment involving safety shutdowns and essential operating machinery must be completed.

11.4 All electrical circuits, plumbing and piping must be tested.

11.5 The Work Site Supervisor / Manager will ensure that all lockout and tag-out procedures have been followed and signed off.

11.6 The Work Site Supervisor / Manager will start up the facility by turning on individual switches to the components that have been shutdown.

11.7 Operational checks will be done to ensure that all equipment is functioning at safe working pressures and voltage.

11.8 The Work Site Supervisor / Manager will give the verbal "all clear" before workers will be allowed to return to work.

11.9 The Work Site Supervisor / Manager or one of their delegates will cancel / remove all roadblocks, terminate evacuation activities, and notify employees to return to normal activities.

APPENDIX 1

DNCI'S EMERGENCY REPORT FORM FOR INCIDENTS INVOLVING EXPLOSIVES

WHO IS CALLING? NAME:_____

PHONE #: _____ TIME:_____DATE:_____

CALLER'S ORGANIZATION:_____

LOCATION OF INCIDENT: _____

WHAT IS THE EMERGENCY?
PROBLEM**:** (Motor Vehicle Accident, Fire, Scattered Product, Disabled Truck, etc.)

_____

PRODUCTS INVOLVED : VISIBLE PLACARDS ? YES_____ NO_____

SHIPPING NAME(S)_____

UN NUMBER(S)_____

HAZARD CLASSIFICATION (ex: 1.1 D) :_____

QUANTITY: _____

INJURIES: _____

PROPERTY DAMAGE:_____

EXPLOSIVES VEHICLE UNIT NUMBER:_____LICENSE NO._____

DRIVER:_____CARRIER:_____

WHEN DID INCIDENT OCCUR? DATE: _____TIME: _____

WHERE IS THE EMERGENCY? (City, Town, Rural Area, Lat. & Long., Specific Directions)

_____

ARE THERE RESIDENCES, BUSINESSES, OR OTHER PUBLIC GATHERING PLACES WITHIN THE EVACUATION ZONE (what, where)?

_____

WHAT ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO THIS POINT IN TIME?_____
(Medical, evacuation, fire fighting, etc.)

_____

APPENDIX 2

DNCI Corporate contact

Name	Position	Cell number
Benoit Choquette	Environmental Manager - Canada	(514) 246-6285
Nicholas Ebsworth	General Manager HSE - Canada	(514) 708-5417
Hubert Fafard	HSE Manager Eastern Canada	(418) 570-9257
Willard Pierce	Regional Manager -West	(403) 836-9029
Francois Lambert	Regional Manager –East	(514) 212-3490
Dale Bodnarchuk	Regional Manager – Central	(705) 715-6672
Seamus Kilcommons	HSE Manager Western Canada	(403) 815-4066
Brad Rhude	Sales Manager - Central	(705) 494-5171
Rick Chopp	HSE Manager – Central Canada	(705) 498-2855
Pierre Poulin	Sales Manager – Quebec/Maritimes	(418) 569-5565
Greg Brown	Sales Manager Western	(403) 512-5127
Bryan Sedrovic	HSE/ Regulatory Affairs Coordinator West	(250) 203-4259

APPENDIX 3

DNCI Emergency Response Advisors (ERA) per area

Name	Position	Cell number	Area (West, Central or East)
Tom Medak	Mgr, Bulk Emulsion Operations	(403) 818-4434	West
Ralph Olson	Operations Manager, Vancouver Island	(250) 713-8720	West
Darren Woodhead	Gregg River worksite supervisor	(780) 223-4491	West
Randy Armella	Bulk Operations Manager	(780) 865-6580	West
Cory Redwood	Manager dnx Drilling/ Joint Ventures	(867) 444 - 8533	West
Kevin S Kelly	Operations Manager – Seismic	(403) 934-0753	West
Tyrone McClean	Operations manager, Manitoba and Saskatchewan	(204) 687-0046	Central
Scott Smith	Operations Manager, Red Lake Ontario	(807) 727-7300	Central
Mike Ertel	Operation Manager – Ontario	(807) 629-9660	Central
Joss Forget	Operations Manager Northern Ontario	(705) 471- 8745	East
David Roy	Manager Plant operations	(418) 570-5604	East
Francois Lambert	Operations Manager	(514) 212-3490	East
Daniel Roy	Dyno Consult , Ste-Sophie	(514) 213-5889	East
Pierre St-George	Regulatory Affairs Canada	(613) 677 - 1051	Canada

APPENDIX 4

SITE: Meadowbank Site

MANAGEMENT AND WORK SITE CONTACT LIST

NAME	TITLE	BUSINESS PHONE	HOME PHONE	CELL PHONE
Doug Robertson	Site Supervisor	(867) 793-4610 *(Option 2; option 1 ext 6804)*		(867) 222-3930
Dennis Wall	Site Supervisor	(867) 793-4610 *(Option 2; option 1 ext 6804)*		(867) 222-3930
Site employees	All employees on shift	(867) 793-4610 *(Option 2; option 1 ext 6804)*		
Tom Medak	Operations Manager	(403) 723-7530		(403) 818-4434
Seamus Kilcommons	HSE Manager	(403) 236-9160 Ext 7547		(403) 815-4066

EXTERNAL CONTACT NUMBERS

ORGANIZATION/CONTACT	LOCATION	PHONE NUMBER
Mine security	Meadowbank	Ext. 6817
Local Fire; ERT	Hinton	Ext 6911
Local Ambulance	Hinton	Ext 6911
Baker Lake RCMP	Hinton	867 793-1111

APPENDIX 5

Area Office Address:
Meadowbank site
Baker Lake, NU

Type of Facility:
Emulsion Plant
AN Tote storage

Emergency Meeting Place Upon Evacuation:
As identified on site orientation forms, employees and visitors are to meet at muster point for head count. Once all persons are accounted for, all will proceed to the Muster Point located at Security Gate #1, located at junction of All Weather Road. (see map)

Emergency Equipment On Hand:
Fire Extinguishers, First Aid Kits, Fire alarm system, video monitoring,

FY 2011 drill conducted

APPENDIX 6

BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

Exact time of call:			
Exact words of caller:			
QUESTIONS TO ASK			
1- When is bomb going to explode?			
2- Where is the bomb?			
3- What does it look like?			
4- What kind of bomb is it?			
5-What will cause it to explode?			
6- Did you place the bomb?			
7- Why?			
8- Where are you calling from?			
9- What is your address?			
10- What is your name?			
CALLER'S VOICE (circle)			
Calm	Slow	Crying	Slurred
Stutter	Deep	Loud	Broken
Giggling	Accent	Angry	Rapid
Stressed	Nasal	Lisp	Excited
Disguised	Sincere	Squeaky	Normal
If voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?			
Were there any background noises?			
Remarks:			
Person receiving call:		Telephone number call received at:	
Date:		Report call immediately to:	

APPENDIX 7

NEW/TRANSFERED EMPLOYEE OR ANNUAL REFRESHER FORM

HSE Employee Orientation Form

To Be Completed By Supervisor (within 2 to 4 weeks of hiring)

(Employee Surname) (Given Names) (Worksite)

(Date of Hire)

(Job / Position) (RFT/ RPT/ Casual / Temp) (End date if applic)

Show & Tell

	Date Completed			Date Completed
Tour Of Facility			Introduction To Staff	
Emergency/Fire Exits & Procedures			Workplace Hazards & Controls	
Environmental Clothing Issued			First Aid & WCB Reporting	
Overview Of Organization			Telephone Contacts	
Work Schedules			Time Sheets & Pay Periods	
Security & Key Control			E-mail & Website Access	
Expense Claims Procedures			Other:	

Documentation Given To &/or Discussed With Employee

Position Description		DYNO G & S Work Rules	
Worksite ERP, TDG ERAP & CCP		MSDS's	
Handling/Transporting Explosives		SOP's	
Employee Guidelines		Policy: HSE & Quality	
Policy: Privacy & Confidentiality		Policy: Substance Abuse	
icy: Violence In The Workplace		Policy: Security	
Policy: Smoking In The Workplace		Performance Reviews	
Other:		Other:	

New Hire Training Completed

Customer Orientation		WHMIS	
TDG Clear Language		PPE (as applicable)	
Handling/Transporting Explosives		Fire Extinguisher	
ICARUS (Incident Reporting)		Take 5 (Hazard Assessment)	
Worksite ERP, TDG ERAP & CCP			

_____ _____ _____

Supervisor (Print Name) Supervisor Signature Date

APPENDIX 8

ANNUAL ERT VISIT REVIEW FORM

Information to be released to Emergency Services

From: Local Emergency Services

Subject: Emergency Response Plan for _____.

The following is a copy of the Emergency Response Plan that has been prepared by Dyno Nobel Inc. Has been received from _____ operations. The ERP has been discussed and being kept on file for future reference. If questions arise, we have been given the contact information for the _____ operations staff.

On _____ the _____ of 2011, AEM ERT responder _____ attended the Dyno Nobel Meadowbank site for an annual visit and ERP review.

Signed:_____

Position:_____

Date:_____

APPENDIX 9

Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulation
Class Quantity Emission Limit

1	Any quantity that could pose a danger to public safety or 50 kg
2	Any quantity that could pose a danger to public safety or any sustained release of 10 minutes or more
3	200 L
4	25 kg
5.1	50 kg or 50 L
5.2	1 kg or 1 L
6.1	5 kg or 5 L
6.2	Any quantity that could pose a danger to public safety or 1 kg or 1 L
7	Any quantity that could pose a danger to public safety. An emission level greater than the level established in section 20 of the *Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations*
8	5 kg or 5 L
9	25 kg or 25 L

Table identified in Section 8.1(1) of Part 8 of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulation Class Quantity Emission Limit

Evacuation/ Muster location