July 21st, 2024

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Re: Follow-up Report Spill #2024-236 – Release of 50 L of Sewage at the Meliadine Gold Mine

On June 23rd, 2024, the Nunavut Spill Line was notified by Agnico Eagle personnel via email (spills@gov.nt.ca) of a sewage spill of approximately 50 L at the Meliadine Gold Project site (spill location coordinates: 63° 2' 21.24" N, 92° 13' 40.67" W). This follow-up report provides supplemental information based on the results of the incident assessment and is being provided in accordance with:

- Nunavut Water Board 2AM-MEL1631 Water Licence (the Licence), Part H, Item 8c.

Description of Incident

On June 23rd, 2024, at approximately 8:30 AM, an estimated 50 liters of sewage spilled onto the industrial pad at the Multi-Service Building (MSB) lift station. A brief power outage at the MSB caused the Variable Frequency Drives (VFDs) to malfunction, thus stopping the sump pumps. When the vacuum truck operators arrived to discharge sewage from the truck into the lift station, the tank overflowed from the inlet pipe, leading to the spill.

No water bodies were affected by the spill. The nearest water body, Lake G2, is approximately 325 meters northwest, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Location of the spill and proximity to waterbodies.

Response and Remediation

Upon seeing the pipe overflow, the vacuum truck operators took immediate action by promptly vacuuming the tank to contain the spill. Subsequently, the E&I Maintenance supervisor was alerted to the pump malfunction. Electricians were quickly dispatched to restart the system, ensuring the incident would not reoccur. The sewage impacted area was hand excavated and the recovered material was brought to Landfarm A as per the Spill Contingency Plan.

Root Cause and Corrective Measures

An assessment was conducted soon after the incident to determine the root cause and contributing factors. The assessment concluded with the following:

- The VFDs did not have the right control parameters, causing them to malfunction following the power outage. The VFDs start automatically when the high-level signal in the lift station switches from off to on. Since the high-level signal was already at the “on” position prior to the power outage, the VFDs did not detect the high-level signal.

The following corrective and preventative actions have been implemented to address the root cause and to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence:

- The VFDs parameters were modified to ensure they would restart right away if the tanks were at a high level. The electrical team simulated a power outage to ensure these parameters would work and the test was successful.

Should you have any questions or require further information, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.

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Sent from Meliadine

Appendix A – Photos

Photo 1: Spill location prior to remediation

Photo 2: Spill location following remediation.