

August 16th, 2025

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Re: Follow-up Report Spill #2025-295 – Release of 50 L of Sewage at the Meliadine Gold Project

On July 18th, 2025, the Nunavut Spill Line was notified by Agnico Eagle personnel via email (spills@gov.nt.ca) of a spill of approximately 50 L of sewage at the Meliadine Gold Mine (spill location coordinates: 63°2'24.39"N, 92°13'42.89"W). This follow-up report provides supplemental information based on the results of the incident assessment and is being provided in accordance with:

Nunavut Water Board 2AM-MEL1631 Water Licence (the Licence), Part H, Item 8c.

Description of Incident

On July 17th, 2025, at 18:30, approximately 50 L of sewage spilled onto the industrial pad outside the Wing 2 lift station. Upon inspection, it was determined that this spill was caused by the loss of power at the lift station pump, causing the lift station to back up and overflow.

The spill occurred within the site's water management infrastructure, and as such, no waterbodies were impacted by the spill. The closest water body, Lake G2, is approximately 230 meters northwest, as seen in Figure 1.






Figure 1: Location of the spill and proximity to waterbodies.

Response and Remediation

Upon discovering the spill, a vacuum truck and an electrician were dispatched to respond to the spill. The pump was turned back on to prevent further spillage at the lift station. The vacuum truck was utilized to empty the contents within the secondary containment. The contaminated material on the ground was excavated and transported to Landfarm A in accordance with the Spill Contingency Plan.



Root Cause and Corrective Measures

An assessment was conducted soon after the incident to determine the root cause and contributing factors. The assessment concluded with the following:

 Supervisors were notified of the high-water level at the lift station via email and HMI page alarm; however, these notifications were not seen in time to prevent the spill.

The following corrective and preventative actions have been implemented to address the root cause and to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

- All radios and email lists were tested, fixed and validated in the lift station surveillance team.
- Additional personnel were added to the distribution list for radio and email notifications regarding lift station alarms, including sewage treatment plant operators and environmental personnel. An internal audit of personnel is being conducted to identify other key stakeholders that would benefit from notifications of alarms and/or equipment failures.

Should you have any questions or require further information, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.





Appendix A – Photos



Photo 1: Spill location





Photo 2: Spill location post remediation